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WALKING WITH TRADITION v. RIDING INTO
TOMORROW: OLINGER V. UNITED STATES
GOLF ASSOCIATION
INTRODUCTION
"The handicapped live among us .... They have the same hopes,
the same fears, and the same ambitions as the rest of us .... In their
quest to achieve the benefits of our society they ask no more than
equality of opportunity . .. " I That equal opportunity must be ex-
tended to competitive sports and, more specifically, to the world of
competitive professional golf. The game of golf, even at the profes-
sional level, is about getting the ball from the tee to the green and into
the hole in the least amount of strokes. Accordingly, professional golf
competition can also be, quite literally, a game of inches. Even the
slightest advantage given to one golfer can translate into one less inch
or one less stroke and ultimately change the outcome of the competi-
tive event. 2 Yet, equal opportunity need not translate into competi-
tive advantage because the disabled competitive athlete enters the
arena at a disadvantage. To level the playing field, adjustments or
modifications should be required to afford the disabled athlete an
equal opportunity to compete with able-bodied competitors. Such a
modification should have been provided to professional golfer, Ford
Olinger.
Ford Olinger, a disabled professional golfer, sought an equal oppor-
tunity to compete in the men's national championship of golf, the
United States Open (U.S. Open), sponsored by the United States Golf
Association (USGA).3 He sought to compete because he had mas-
tered the "fundamental" skills of golf: striking and putting the ball
into the hole in a minimum number of strokes. However, because of
his disability, Mr. Olinger lacked the capacity to comply with the
1. 118 CONG. REc. 3320 (1972) (statement of Sen. Harrison Williams).
2. For example, Payne Stewart, shooting a four-round score of 279, won the 1999 U.S. Open
by one stroke over Phil Mickelson, with the tournament outcome decided on the final putt of the
final hole of the competition. Putt Falls; Stewart Wins Second Open, ESPN GOLF ONLINE.COM at
http://espn.go.com/golfonline/USOpen1999 (last visited February 18, 2001).
3. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001-02 (7th Cir. 2000), aff'g Olinger v.
United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), vacated by Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4150 (June 4, 2001) (remanding to United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).
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USGA rule requiring golfers to walk eighteen holes of a competitive
round.4 Mr. Olinger requested a waiver of that rule, which would
have allowed him to use a golf cart during the competitive rounds of
the U.S. Open.5 The USGA denied his request.6 By denying Mr.
Olinger the use of golf cart, the USGA effectively denied Mr. Olinger
equal access to compete in the U.S. Open.
Mr. Olinger sued the USGA under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), which protects disabled individuals against
discrimination and ensures equal access to "the full and equal enjoy-
ment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations" provided through public accommodations. 7 The protection
afforded to disabled individuals by the ADA requires public accom-
modations to provide reasonable modifications for disabled individu-
als unless the entity can establish that the requested modifications
would fundamentally alter the nature of the program at issue or im-
pose an undue hardship on the entity.8 The District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit rejected Mr. Olinger's claim because they
found that a waiver of the USGA walking rule would fundamentally
alter or potentially change the outcome of the U.S. Open.9
A strikingly similar claim was raised in the United States District
Court of Oregon and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc..10 The Martin decision di-
rectly conflicted with the Olinger decision. The Martin courts held
that because walking was only an incidental, as opposed to an essen-
tial, part of competitive professional golf, the provision of a golf cart
to Mr. Martin would not fundamentally alter the nature of the com-
petitive rounds.'' The United States Supreme Court resolved this
conflict, holding in Martin that Congress intended the ADA to reach
into professional sports and guide organizations such as the USGA
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1001-03.
6. Id. at 1004.
7. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
9. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006-07, affg Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
10. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4115 (2001), affg Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), affg Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or.
1998).
11. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4115, 4116 (2001), aff'g Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 995 (9th Cir. 2000), affg Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322
(D. Or. 1998).
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and the PGA as to how much modification of their rules is necessary
to comply with the ADA standards.1 2
Competitive golf and competitive sports present an additional di-
mension to analysis of Title III of the ADA. Because of the nature of
competitive sports, even a slight advantage given to a disabled individ-
ual over the able-bodied competitor by the ADA regulations could
potentially alter the outcome of a sporting event or fundamentally al-
ter the nature of the event. This presents a difficulty for courts analyz-
ing Title III provisions as they apply to disabled athletes, especially
those at the professional level. Courts must begin the analysis by de-
termining whether the desired modification is substantive to the na-
ture of the sport and whether alteration of the rule may change the
ultimate outcome of the event. This requires courts to determine
where reasonable modification of a rule ends and fundamental altera-
tion begins. The ADA regulations require public and most private
entities to make reasonable modifications. However, does this in-
fringe upon the rights of the sporting organizations to set their own
standards for the games?
This Note will analyze the decisions of the District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana and the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Olinger v. United States Golf Association.'3 Part II will dis-
cuss the background and requirements of the ADA that support Mr.
Olinger's claim.1 4 Part I will also describe several cases involving
athletes raising claims under the ADA and those courts' reasonings
behind their decisions.15 Part III will introduce the parties to this ac-
tion and outline the rulings of the district court and the court of ap-
peals.16 Part IV will analyze the Olinger decisions in terms of the
privilege at issue. Specifically, Part IV will discuss whether the
USGA, as a private organization, must be subject to ADA regulation
and whether individual inquiry into Mr. Olinger's situation would
have revealed that provision of a golf cart, while breaking with tradi-
tion, would have neither undermined the purpose of the walking rule
nor fundamentally altered the outcome of the U.S. Open.17 Part V
12. See PGA Tour, Inc. v Martin, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4115 (2001).
13. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), affg Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), vacated by Olinger v. United States Golf
Ass'n, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4150 (June 4, 2001).
14. See infra notes 19-110 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 111-257 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 258-338 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 339-425 and accompanying text.
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will examine the potential impact that the United States Supreme
Court ruling in Martin will have on the world of competitive sports.' 8
II. BACKGROUND
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act provide powerful tools for the disabled to fight discrimination in
the workplace and public accommodations. This section will discuss
the purposes and requirements of these legislative enactments.
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, precursor to the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), prohibited discrimination against the
disabled by programs receiving federal financial assistance.' 9
Originating in 197220 as an attempt to expand the Vocational Rehabil-
itation Act,2' the Rehabilitation Act of 197322 was enacted with the
ambitious goal of providing equal rights to the nation's twenty-eight
to fifty million physically and mentally handicapped individuals. 23
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is perhaps the most significant
and far reaching section in terms of protecting the disabled against
discrimination. It provides, "No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... ",24 The Rehabilitation Act, as amended in 1974, clari-
fied the purpose of the original Act by enlarging the definition of
"handicapped individual" to include any person who: "(i) has a physi-
cal or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impair-
ment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. '25 The legis-
18. See infra notes 426-28 and accompanying text.
19. The Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
20. S. REP. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076.
21. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-42(b) (1920), repealed by 29 U.S.C.
§ 790(a) (1973).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 335 (1973). For the history of the Rehabilitation Act, see S.
REIP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076.
23. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6400 (stat-
ing that the inability to accurately determine the number of disabled individuals in the country
was a sad commentary on the nation's public policy towards the disabled).
24. The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
25. The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (1994). Section 705(20)(B), applying to
employment situations, defines "handicapped individual" as "any individual who (i) has a physi-
cal or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap
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lative history of the 1974 amendment indicates a congressional intent
for section 504 to require federally funded programs and entities to
take affirmative actions to accommodate the handicapped. 26 Congres-
sional reports reflect the intent to prohibit institutions receiving fed-
eral funds from discriminating against handicapped individuals in any
manner.27 The congressional intent was supported by the implemen-
tation of regulations imposing specific affirmative obligations on re-
cipients of federal funds, unless they could show that such
accommodations would impose undue hardship. 28 For those meeting
the definition of "disabled," the Rehabilitation Act required federally
funded programs to affirmatively provide "reasonable accommoda-
tions" to provide access to those programs. 29
However, the reach of the Rehabilitation Act's coverage was lim-
ited to federal agencies, federally funded programs, or contracts with
the federal government; therefore, the majority of private sector em-
ployees and users of private sector facilities could not benefit from the
law's proscriptions. 30 Moreover, courts inconsistently applied section
504 while attempting to provide greater clarity to the Act.31 Modeled
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an implied private right
of action allowed enforcement of the Rehabilitation Act by allowing
individuals to file claims to require compliance with the Act. 32 How-
ever, contrary to legislative intent, courts restricted enforcement of
to employment and (ii) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from
vocational rehabilitation services provided." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(A) (2000).
26. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6405-07.
The report to the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee stated that section 504 was in-
tended to prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals as well as to require, when applica-
ble, affirmative acts to integrate disabled individuals.
27. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1978): see also 120 CONG. REC. 30.551
(1974) (statement of Sen. Robert Stafford). "[A] test of discrimination against a handicapped
individual under Section 504 should not be couched either in terms of whether such individual's
disability is a handicap to employment or whether such individual can reasonably be expected to
benefit, in terms of employment, from vocational rehabilitation services. Such a test is irrelevant
to the many forms of potential discrimination covered by Section 504." Id.
28. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (2000) (listing some reasonable accommodations that may be re-
quired to make facilities handicapped accessible, such as restructuring jobs, modifying work
schedules, acquiring or modifying equipment and providing readers or interpreters).
29. The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
30. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr - A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT,
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 26 - 28 (1990).
31. See Camenisch v. Univ. of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1980) (granting preliminary
injunction to require sign language interpreter for deaf student because the student's handicap
did not prevent him from realizing the benefits of his training). But see Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d
557, 565 n.19 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that not all types of modifications are required even if the
disabled individual would realize the principal benefits of the program with the modification).
32. See Steven William Gerse, Note: Mending the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 701, 708-09.
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section 504 to intended beneficiaries of federal funding. 33 Courts also
rejected a "unified entity approach," which provided that once an en-
tity became involved in a program or activity receiving federal fund-
ing, the entire entity was not necessarily subject to the requirements
of section 504.34
Courts have also inconsistently interpreted the obligation to take
affirmative actions to modify accommodations to make programs
handicap accessible. 35 The United States Supreme Court held that
section 504 did not require entities to disregard disabilities, make sub-
stantial modifications, or lower standards to accommodate disabled
persons.36 It distinguished between evenhanded treatment of quali-
fied disabled individuals and affirmative efforts to overcome the hand-
icap. 37 Defining a "qualified handicapped person" as a "person who is
able to meet the program's requirements in spite of rather than except
for the handicap,' 38 the Court conceded that a "situation may arise
where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unrea-
sonable and discriminatory. ' 39 However, the Court's holding was lim-
ited to the facts of the particular case and left open the possibility that
in certain circumstances, failure to modify a program may violate sec-
33. See Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding
that a handicapped person could not bring an employment claim under section 504 unless the
primary objective of the federal funding was a provision of employment; here, the federal funds
provided to the nursing home that fired the plaintiff were directed toward patient treatment).
34. See Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co. Inc., 629 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding
section 504 does not forbid all forms of discrimination against handicapped persons); see also
Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding disabled plaintiff did not have stand-
ing to bring a claim under section 504 because plaintiff was not involved in the specific federally
funded program); but see Flanagan v. President and Dirs. of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp.
377, 384 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that because Georgetown College accepted federal assistance
to construct its law school, it could not discriminate in providing services and benefits through-
out its institution to handicapped students).
35. See Southeastern Cmty. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979) (suggesting that public
entities did not have a general obligation to take affirmative actions to tailor programs to accom-
modate the disabled: "[Nleither the language, purpose, nor history of Section 504 reveals an
intent to impose an affirmative action obligation on all recipients of federal funds."); but see
Georgia Assoc. of Retarded Children v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp 1263, 1280 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(holding that school's policy of not providing public education beyond the required 180 days per
year for retarded children did not consider individual needs of handicapped children, and there-
fore violated section 504).
36. Davis, 442 U.S. at 411.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 406.
39. Id. at 412-13.
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tion 504, leaving the district courts with the discretion to determine
what circumstances constituted a violation. 40
Inconsistent interpretation and lack of clarity of the Rehabilitation
Act led Congress to enact the ADA, affording greater protection from
discrimination for disabled individuals.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Introduced in 198841 and signed into law in 1990 by President
George H. W. Bush,42 Congress enacted the ADA to ensure individu-
als with physical and mental disabilities the "right to move freely
within our society without confronting discrimination," which is a
right guaranteed to other citizens through the Civil Rights Act of
1964.43 As a "policy statement to the world,' 44 "[t]he ADA [wa]s a
pronouncement that our society w[ould] no longer tolerate lost poten-
tial - that we w[ould] no longer judge people by their disabilities but
by their abilities - that we w[ould] no longer design a society which
excludes, but one that includes. ' 45 The ADA broadened the reach of
protection for disabled individuals by proscribing discrimination based
on disability without regard to whether the entity was federally
funded .46
The purpose of the ADA was to provide a "clear and comprehen-
sive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination," with
"strong [and] consistent enforceable standards, ' 47 to ensure "equality
of opportunity, full participation [in society], independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for [the disabled]. '48 Congress determined
that forty-three million Americans had one or more physical or
40. Id. See also Board of Education v. F.C. ex rel. R.C., 2 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642 (D. N.J. 1998)
(upholding an ALJ decision that Section 504 required the local Board of Education to provide
free education to a disabled student.
41. Pub. L. No. 101-336 § 2, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (co-authored by Senators Bob Dole and Tom
Harkin).
42. S. REP. No. 933, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1990).
43. Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
923, 925-26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 a to a-6, 2000 e to e-17 (1994)(prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations and employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin).
44. Edward T. Hearn, No Easy Ride for Disabled, CHICAGo TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 1989, § 7 at 1.
45. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearing on H.R. 2273 before the Sub-
committees on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the Commission on Educa-
tion and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1989) (statement of Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Counsel to
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
46. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) with 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
47. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
48. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994).
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mental disabilities. 49 Further, it was expected that the number of dis-
abled individuals would increase as the population aged.50 Despite
protection under the Rehabilitation Act, many disabled individuals
continued to suffer discrimination in the areas of employment, hous-
ing, public accommodations, education, recreation, transportation,
communications, health services, and access to public services.51 Such
discrimination continued to result in exclusion from many areas of
life, as well as inflexible rules and policies with no legal recourse.5 2
Congress believed that without the ADA, pervasive discrimination
would continue to "deny people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society [was] justifiably famous." 53 The ADA made a
significant impact on the lives of the disabled by opening access to
places not previously accessible.5 4 Legislation was necessary to pro-
tect individuals with disabilities, who were members of a politically
powerless, discrete and insular minority that had been subjected to
purposeful and unequal treatment.55
Divided into three main titles regulating employment, public enti-
ties, and public accommodations, the scope of the ADA broadened
the reach of the Rehabilitation Act to extend into many facets of a
disabled individual's life.5 6
49. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). The ADA used the
term "disabled" instead of the term "handicapped" used in the Rehabilitation Act. These terms
are used interchangeably in common usage and are regarded to have the same meaning. Id.
Congress, in the ADA, defined "disabled" according to the definition used in the Rehabilitation
Act, as "an individual [who has] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities, a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such
impairment." See The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(c)(1) (1994); The Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)-(c) (1994). A physical impairment is "[a]ny physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, includ-
ing speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine .... 28 C.F.R. § 41-31(b)(I)(i) (2000).
50. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). The ADA will likely
protect many now healthy individuals, as only fifteen percent of the disabled are born with their
disabilities. See PRACTICING LAW INSTrITUTE, PLI LIrTIGATION AN) ADMINISTRATION PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK, SERIES #H-562 (1997).
51. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(3) (1994).
52. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(5), (7) (1994).
53. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994).
54. Examples include employment, grocery stores, movie theaters, etc. It was no longer nec-
essary to prove receipt of federal funds to enforce the standards of the ADA.
55. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 (a)(2)-(5), (7) (1994).
56. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994) (Title I regulating
employers); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994) (Title II regulating public entities); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181-12189 (1994) (Title III regulating places of public accommodation).
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1. Title I of the ADA - Employment
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in the workplace based
on disability, stating that "no [employer] shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability ' 57 with respect to any terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment.58 The broad definition of em-
ployer as "covered entity" applies to private employers with fifteen or
more employees, as well as employment agencies, labor organizations,
and joint labor-management committees. 59 Title I requires that rea-
sonable accommodations be made to facilities, making them "readily
accessible" to otherwise qualified disabled employees. 60 Title I of the
ADA incorporates many of the standards set forth in section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.61 An otherwise qualified individual is "one
with a disability who with or without the reasonable accommodation
is qualified to perform the essential function of the occupation." 62
57. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
58. Id. (stating that this section includes job applications, hiring, advancement, discharge,
compensation, and job training).
59. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12112(2) (mirroring the defini-
tion of employer in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e). The
definition of "employer" does not extend to religious organizations giving preference in hiring
members of their own religion, or the United States, or a private membership club with tax-
exempt status. S. REP. No. 933, § 307, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 10,954, 10,959
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1989).
60. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
61. Compare The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000) with The Re-
habilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Under the
ADA, suggested "reasonable accommodations" include (but are not limited to): a) making ex-
isting facilities readily accessible to and usable by disabled individuals; b) job restructuring; c)
developing modified work schedules; d) reassignment to a vacant position; e) acquiring or modi-
fying existing equipment or devices; f) modifying examination, training materials or policies; and
g) providing qualified readers or interpreters for blind or deaf employees. See S. REP. No. 933,
§ 101(8), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 10,954, 10,955 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1989). For
similar suggestions under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see 29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (Depart-
ment of Labor regulation); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (Department of Health and Human Services
regulation).
Title I became effective July 26, 1992. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, § 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990) (allowing delayed enactment for two years); see
Eileen P. Kelly and Robert J. Aalberts, Americans with Disabilities Act: Undue Hardship for
Private Sector Employers?, 41 LAB. L.J. 675, 676 (1990) (quoting Hearings on H.R. 2283 before
the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 1989 (statement of Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General of the
United States)). Mr. Thornburgh discussed employers' need for delay in ADA enforcement to
give employers time to comply with the requirements of the ADA. Id.
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining qualified indi-
vidual). The ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a disability" follows the Rehabilita-
tion Act's definition of "qualified individual with a handicap." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(2000) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994) (defining "individual with a disability") and 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.203(a)(6) (2000) (using almost identical language to define "individual with a handicap").
See also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993) (equating "handicapped
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Determined on a case-by-case basis, Title I may require employers to
modify or renovate existing policies, equipment, or work areas. How-
ever, the ADA provides an exception to its standards if the employer
can demonstrate that compliance would present an "undue hard-
ship" 63 or that the disabled individual poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of another person in the workplace. 64
2. Title II - Regulating Public Entities
Title II of the ADA significantly broadened the protection of dis-
abled individuals provided by the Rehabilitation Act as a comprehen-
sive mandate to public entities requiring that services, programs, or
activities be made accessible to all disabled individuals. It also prohib-
its all public entities, such as local and state governments, from dis-
criminating against individuals with disabilities regardless of whether
the entity received federal funds. 65 It prohibits public entities from
excluding any qualified individual on the basis of disability from par-
ticipating in or benefiting from services, programs, or activities of the
public entity.66 Moreover, Title II requires public entities to provide
equal and integrated access to all such programs, services, or activi-
ties. 67 Title II also imposes additional requirements, beyond those
stipulated in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, regarding equally
accessible communications.68 Title II also clarified the requirements
of section 504 regarding public transportation by extending the scope
individual" with "individual with a disability" under the Rehabilitation Act). Essential functions
of the job include those that are "fundamental and not marginal." S. REI'. No. 116, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 2, 26 (1989).
63. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1211 ](10)(A) (1994) (defining "undue
hardship" as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense"); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (providing "undue hardship" exception). Factors to be considered
when determining whether an accommodation would constitute an undue hardship include the
size, type, and budget of the employer's program, and the nature and the cost of the accommo-
dation at issue. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B) (1994). For similar standards under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (2000) (D.H.H.S. regulation).
64. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994) (including "not pos[ing]
a direct threat to . . .others" as part of the job qualification standard).
65. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (2000) (making prohibition against discrimination on the basis of a disability set forth in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applicable to all programs, activities, and services provided,
or made available, by state and local governments). Compare to 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Rehabilitation
Act only applicable to federally funded programs activities); see supra note 22 and accompany-
ing text.
66. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2000). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2000) (requiring physical
accessibility).
67. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2000) (stating that separate programs for individuals with disa-
bilities not permitted, integration is a fundamental purpose of the ADA). See also 56 Fed. Reg.
35.713 (1989).
68. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1989).
2001] OLINGER v. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION 135
to cover all public entities providing public transportation, regardless
of whether such entities received federal funds. 69 Because one objec-
tive of the ADA was to provide mobility to all disabled Americans,
70
Title II applies to the operation of vehicles, as well as the design of
those vehicles. 71
Title II of the ADA applies to all activities of public entities and
requires that all employment practices be made accessible to disabled
individuals through reasonable accommodations to workers and appli-
cants with disabilities.72 Moreover, the scope of Title II extends to
activities of state and local governments, such as colleges, universities,
publicly operated parks, or police operations. 73 A public entity may
be exempt from the requirements of Title II with a sufficient showing
that making reasonable accommodations would constitute an undue
hardship, which is defined as an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense. 74
3. Title III - Regulating Public Accommodations
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled indi-
viduals in all places of public accommodations, including those that
are privately operated,75 "covering almost every facet of American
69. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12141(2) (1994) (designating "public
transportation" as "bus, rail, or any other conveyance [excluding air travel] that provide[dl the
general public with general or special service on a regular and continuing basis"); see also H.R.
REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1990). Public school transportation is exempt from the
ADA because it is covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 49 C.F.R. § 37.27 (2000).
70. H.R. REP. No. 485 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2 at 58 (1990).
71. 49 C.F.R. § 37.161 (2000) (covering maintenance of specially equipped vehicles in proper
working condition); 49 C.F.R. § 37.173 (2000) (requiring personnel be properly trained in the
operation of specially equipped vehicles); 49 C.F.R. § 37.167 (2000) (requiring accessibility of
information about schedules, fares, routes, etc.).
72. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994).
73. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
74. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). Factors considered in de-
termining whether undue hardship would be present include: a) the nature and the cost of the
accommodation; b) the overall financial resources of the facility involved and the impact of the
accommodation on the expenses and the resources of the facility; c) the overall financial re-
sources of the covered entity; d) the type and location of the facility and the operation, and e)
the impact of the accommodation on the operation of the facility, including the impact on the
ability of other employees to perform their duties and the ability to conduct business. Id. See,
e.g., Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying a similar cost analysis under
the Rehabilitation Act). Undue hardship may also include requiring a substantial alteration in
the nature of the program or service, or a situation in which the disabled individual poses a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.
75. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (defining public accom-
modation as a private entity that falls into any of the enumerated categories including: 1) places
of lodging; 2) establishments serving food or drink: 3) places of exhibition or entertainment,
including motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, and stadiums 4) places of public gather-
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life in which a business establishment or other entity serves or comes
into contact with the general public."' 76 "The purpose behind Title III
and its attendant regulations is to facilitate the removal of physical,
organizational, and attitudinal barriers from places of public accom-
modation and commercial facilities. ' 77 Similar to Title I of the ADA,
Title III imposes the same obligations on covered entities, requiring
"reasonable accommodation" and prohibiting eligibility criteria in-
tended to screen out disabled individuals. 78 Generally, Title III re-
quires operators and owners of public accommodations to allow
disabled individuals to equally participate in or benefit from the
goods, services, and accommodations provided by the entity. They
must do this by making "reasonable modifications" in their practices
or policies, unless such modifications are shown to "fundamentally al-
ter" the nature of the goods or services offered or would result in an
"undue burden" on the entity.79 Title III does not, however, require
that disabled persons "achieve the identical result or level of achieve-
ment of non-disabled persons, but does mean that persons with disa-
bilities must be afforded equal opportunity to obtain the same
result." 80
Congress identified widespread discrimination based on disability,
including relegating disabled persons to "inferior status in our soci-
ety," in which the disabled were "severely disadvantaged socially, vo-
cationally, economically, and educationally," and "denied the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis .... "81 Congress concluded
that discrimination existed in "critical areas" of life, including places
of "public accommodation. '82 By captioning the ADA as an Act in-
ing, including auditoriums, convention centers, and lecture halls; 5) sales or rental establish-
ments; 6) service establishments; 7) public transportation stations; 8) places of public display or
collection; 9) parks, zoos, amusement parks, and other places of recreation; 10) schools and
other places of education; 11) social service establishments; and 12) gymnasiums, health spas,
bowling alleys, golf courses, and other places of exercise or recreation).
76. S. REP. No. 933 §302 (a), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 10,954, 10,957 (1989).
77. HENRY H. PERRrr, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Act HANDBOOK 246 (1997).
78. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182 (b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994). See also
Christopher M. Parent, Martin v. PGA Tour: A Misapplication of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 26 J. LEGIS. 123, 131-32 (2000). See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2000).
80. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 66 (1989).
81. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 99 12101 (a)(2), (6), (9) (1994).
82. This is supported by voluminous documentation, including seven reports referenced in
congressional committee reports. See S. REP. No. 101-116 at 6 (1989); H.R. REP No. 101-485, pt.
2 at 28 (1990). The seven reports include NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDE-
PENDENCE (1986); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE
(1988); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVII)UAL
ABILITIES (1983); Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERI-
CANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (1986); LOUIS HARRIS AND
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tended to establish a "clear and comprehensive" prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of disability,8 3 Congress clearly indicated that
it was not seeking to address discrimination based on disability in a
"partial or piecemeal fashion. ' '8 4 Title III was drafted in extremely
broad terms, expanding the scope of coverage of public accommoda-
tions to support the comprehensive nature of the ADA.
85
It [was] critical to define places of public accommodation to include
all places open to the public, not simply restaurants, hotels, and
places of entertainment (which [were] the types of establishments
covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) because discrimi-
nation against people with disabilities [was] not limited to specific
categories of public accommodations. 86
Congress consciously based Title III of the ADA on the framework of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.87 Case law concerning Title II of the
Civil Rights Act guides courts to broadly interpret regulation of public
accommodations consistent with "the overriding purpose" of Title III
of the ADA, which is the elimination of discrimination reaching enti-
ties "because of a service it provides to direct participants in some
sport or activity, as well as, because it entertains spectators." 88 Be-
cause the scope of Title III of the ADA is broader than the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which covers participants in athletic contests, it
may be assumed that Congress intended to cover such participants
ASSOCIATES, THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS (1987); REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC (1988); and
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISA-
BILITIES (1990).
83. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
84. Brief Amici Curiae of the Honorable Robert J. Dole, Tom Harkin, Steny H. Hoyer, James
M. Jeffords and Edward M. Kennedy in Support of the Respondent at 6, PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000) (Interest of the Amici, the Senators were drafters and co-
sponsors of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on file with the author). See supra notes 47-48
and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 35 (1990) (quoting testimony of United States Attorney
General Thornburgh, Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings on H.R. 2273 before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 101st Cong at
192 (1989)).
87. See, e.g., The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (1994) (using remedies
and procedures set forth in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a -3(a) as the
remedies and procedures under Title III of the ADA); 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994) (exempting from
the scope of Title III of the ADA "private clubs or establishments exempted from coverage
under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(e) (1994)); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7) (1994) (using "if the operation of such entities affect[s] commerce" language from
Civil Rights Act of 1964 definition of "public accommodation," 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(1) (1994) (defining "commerce" in Title III of the ADA in the same terms as Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)).
88. Amicus Brief by Senators Dole, et al. at 10, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 204 F.3d 994 (9th
Cir. 2000) (on file with the author).
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under Title III of the ADA.8 9 Two Civil Rights Act cases involved
alleged discrimination against golfers, with those courts holding that
Title II of the Civil Rights Act applied to the participants and not only
to the spectators of events held at the public accommodation, the golf
course. 91)
Congress expressly created a few exceptions to the expansive cover-
age imposed by Title III of the ADA, such as religious organizations,
private clubs, or establishments.91 However, Title III did not create
exceptions by implication. 92
Congress derived the "reasonable modification" of Title II193 and
"reasonable accommodation" of Title 194 requirements from prior dis-
89. See Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that
Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act is not to be read "with narrowed eye but with open minds attuned
to the clear and strong purpose of the Act, namely, to secure for all citizens the full enjoyment of
facilities described in the Act which are open to the general public"); United States v. Slidell
Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 480-82 (E.D. La. 1974) (holding that both the intentional
exclusion of black football players, and the subsequent denial to their parents of the opportunity
to watch their children play football, violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act); United States v.
Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (holding racial discrimination at
swimming and dancing facilities was subject to Title II of the Civil Rights Act because of the
effects on the participants and on those who came to watch the participants).
90. See Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966). This case was brought
as a class action seeking to require the operators of a public golf course to permit black golfers to
play on their course. The court ruled that the golf course was a place of exhibition or entertain-
ment under Title 11. Id. at 477. The court held that while "the Act prohibits discrimination
among spectators who patronize a place of exhibition or entertainment, its application is not
limited to spectators if the place of exhibition or entertainment provides facilities for the public
to participate ..... Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected both golf spectators and partici-
pants from discrimination. See also Wesley v. City of Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698, 700-03 (S.D.
Ga. 1969) (holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act prevented a private golf association from
engaging in racial discrimination in a city golf tournament). Construing the language of Title II
liberally, the Wesley court enjoined the golf association from holding the tournament until it
discontinued its discriminatory practices. Id. See also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 4115, *35 (20(11). PGA tournaments offer at least two "privileges" to the public - "that
of watching the golf competition and that of competing in it." Id.
91. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A) (1994). This portion was
modeled after the "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House exception" to lodging establishments set
forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1). 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994) (exempt-
ing "religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations" and by reference to
Civil Rights Act of 1964, "private clubs and establishments" 42 U.S.C. §2000-a(e) (1994)). Other
examples of express exemptions include 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (excluding transvestites from the
terms "disabled" or "disability"); 42 U.S.C. § 12110(a) (1994) (excluding individuals currently
using illegal drugs from the term "individual with a disability"); 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (1994)
(excluding homosexuality and bisexuality from the definition of disability under the ADA).
92. Amicus Brief of Senators Dole and Harkin at 16, PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin, 204 F.3d 994
(9th Cir. 2000) (on file with author).
93. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
94. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
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ability anti-discrimination statutes,95 regulations,96 and case law. 97
Reasonable modification is required because "discrimination against
[people with disabilities] cannot be eliminated if programs, activities,
and tasks are always structured in the ways people with 'normal' phys-
ical and mental abilities customarily undertake them. Adjustment or
modifications of opportunities to permit [people with disabilities] to
participate fully have been broadly termed 'reasonable accommoda-
tion.'"98 Reasonable accommodation is defined as "providing or
modifying devices, services, or facilities or changing practices or pro-
cedures in order to match a particular person with a particular pro-
gram or activity. Individualizing opportunities is this definition's
essence." 99 Therefore, analysis of a request for reasonable modifica-
tion of a rule or practice must focus on the "purpose" of the rule or
practice, rather than its context. 1°0 The central objective of the ADA
is to allow disabled persons to participate and compete on an equal
basis, thereby necessitating that reasonable modifications be made to
the way activities and programs are structured to include the disabled
in the participation and competition. 10
95. See The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1994) (requir-
ing entities "to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person [persons with disabilities] equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling").
96. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1990) (Department of Labor regulation to implement
section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1990)(D.H.H.S. regulation to imple-
ment section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
97. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987): Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
98. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABILITIES 102 (1983) [hereinafter "THE SPECrRUM"]. See also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295-96
nn.12 & 16 (citing Commission on Civil Rights report as authority).
99. THE SPECTRUM, supra note 98, at 102. See also Crowder v. Kitigawa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th
Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997).
100. See Southeastern Cmty. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1979) (requiring the en-
tity to demonstrate that the requirement was essential to the scope and purpose of the program).
See also Letter of Patricia Roberts Harris to College Presidents, Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (Oct. 5, 1979).
In identifying an essential function to determine if an individual with a disability is
qualified, the employer should focus on the purpose of the function and result to be
accomplished, rather than the manner in which the function presently is performed ....
Although it may be essential that the function be performed, frequently it is not essen-
tial that it be performed in a particular way.
Id. at 400 (referring to Title I requirement of reasonable accommodation, comparable to Title III
reasonable modification requirement).
101. See, e.g., the remarks of James Brady, President Reagan's former press secretary, 135
CONG. REC. S 10791 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (remarks of James Brady, President Reagan's for-
mer press secretary). Mr. Brady commented:
Passage of the ADA will increase the acceptance, dignity, and full participation of citi-
zens with disabilities. We do not want pity or sympathy. All we want is the same civil
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Title III of the ADA requires public accommodations to make rea-
sonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures, allowing an
individual with a disability the opportunity to obtain the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, or accommodations being offered.' 0 2 How-
ever, a public accommodation is not required to make such
modifications if it "can demonstrate ... [that it] would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations."10 3 The concept of fundamental alteration
implies that "some program functions and program requirements are
essential, while others may be only incidental. The incidental-essen-
tial distinction is also consistent with the premise that there are fre-
quently equally effective ways in which tasks and activities may be
restructured to achieve similar objectives."'' 0 4 The Department of Jus-
tice defines fundamental alteration as a "modification that is so signif-
icant that it alters the essential nature of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered."' 05 In applying
the concept of fundamental alteration, courts have outlined some im-
plications: alterations are not required if they would endanger a pro-
gram's viability; 0 6 modifications are not required if they would
"jeopardize the effectiveness" of a program or involve a "major re-
structuring;"' 1 7 and modifications that would alter an entity so as to
create a new program are not required. 10 8 The analysis of whether a
requested modification constitutes a fundamental alteration must be
done on a case-by-case basis, requiring a public accommodation to
demonstrate that the particular modification for the disabled individ-
ual fundamentally alters the relevant good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation. 10 9 The burden of proof lies with the
public accommodation to establish that the modification requested
rights and opportunities that all citizens have. We want fairness, acceptance, and the
chance to contribute fully to our nation - just like everyone else.
Id.
102. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
103. Id.
104. THE SPECRUM, supra note 98, at 124.
105. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
TrrLF III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 27 (1990).
106. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855 (10th Cir.
1982).
107. Rhode Island Handicapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 549 F.
Supp. 592, 607 (D.R.I. 1982).
108. Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 707-09 (3d Cir. 1979).
109. See THE SPECIRUM, supra note 98, at 102 (stating that "individualizing opportunities" is
the "essence" of the reasonable modification requirement). See also H.R. REP. No. 10-485, pt. 3,
at 39 (1990) (applying to Title I and stating that "[a] reasonable accommodation should be tai-
lored to the needs of the individual and the requirements of the job").
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constitutes a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program at
issue." 0
Disability claims by athletes under the ADA present courts with
unique circumstances, requiring analyses of not only the nature of the
alterations requested, but also the impact on the competitive arenas
sought to be modified.
C. Athletes Raising Claims under the ADA
Disabled athletes, at all levels of competition, may bring claims of
discrimination based on their disability under the ADA. This section
outlines select cases at the high school, collegiate, and professional
levels, illustrating that ADA claims involving competitive sports pre-
sent unique situations requiring courts to adduce the purpose of the
rule or policy at issue and possibly adding another dimension, compet-
itive advantage, to the ADA analysis.
1. Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association 1
The plaintiffs, Ronald Sandison and Craig Stanley, were both
nineteen-year-old high school seniors that were two years behind their
peers in school because of learning disabilities.1 12 The plaintiffs
sought waivers of age eligibility requirements imposed by the Michi-
gan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) that barred them
from participating in interscholastic track and cross-country competi-
tion.113 The MHSAA eligibility regulations prohibited participation
in interscholastic competition if a student reached his or her nine-
teenth birthday before September first of the current school year. 114
According to the MHSAA, the purpose of the age requirement was to
safeguard against injury "in case of over-age and correspondingly
over-sized participants," and to prevent "any unfair competitive ad-
110. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Consistent
with the burden of proof of undue hardship in Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(1994) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794 (1994). See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 60-
741, Appendix A at paragraph 1 (2000) (section 503 regulation) (stating "unless the contractor
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
its business"); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (2000) (D.H.H.S. section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act regu-
lation regarding recipients of federal funds) (stating "unless the recipient can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program"); 29
C.F.R. § 1614.203(c)(1) (2000) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission section 501 regu-
lation) (stating "unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operations of its program").
111. 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
112. Id. at 488-89.
113. Id. at 485, 489.
114. Id. at 489.
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vantage that older and larger participants might provide." 115 The two
students sued the MHSAA and their respective school systems under
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA for unlawfully excluding them
from interscholastic athletic competition."16
a. The District Court
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan granted preliminary injunctive relief, holding that the MHSAA
had "downgrade[d] the importance of interscholastic sports in the
plaintiffs' learning programs."' ' 7 The MHSAA managed interscholas-
tic sports and competition at almost every public and private secon-
dary school in the state of Michigan.' 18 The district court found that
because of the MHSAA's involvement in the schools, it was not only a
public entity, but also operated a place of entertainment, thereby sub-
jecting it to the regulations set forth in Titles II and III of the ADA."19
The MHSAA argued that the plaintiffs did not meet the "otherwise
qualified" requirement because they failed to meet the age require-
ment of the eligibility regulations. 2o1 However, the district court held
that the appropriate inquiry in this case was whether the disabled indi-
viduals met the program's requirements for participation, in spite of
their disabilities.' 2' Overprotective rules and policies may subject dis-
abled individuals to not only outright intentional exclusion, but also
discriminatory effects. The failure to make reasonable modifications
to existing practices may actually perpetuate the discriminatory effects
of facially neutral rules.' 22 While admitting that the age rule was nec-
essary, the district court held that it conflicted with the ADA and the
115. Id. at 490.
116. Id. at 485.
117. Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 488-89.
118. Id. at 487.
119. Id.
12(0. Id at 489.
121. Id. See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (citing Southeastern College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), as requiring a balance between providing meaningful access to an
otherwise qualified disabled individual by making reasonable accommodations in the program or
benefit and the interests of the program). See also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 287-88, n.17 (1987) (stating that "[w]hen a [disabled] person is not able to perform the
essential functions of the job, the court must also consider whether any reasonable accommoda-
tion by the employer would enable the [disabled] person to perform those functions."); Brennan
v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261-66 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the assertion of Davis that an "other-
wise qualified" person must be able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of the
disability, following the inquiry set forth in Alexander v. Choate of whether some "reasonable
accommodation" is available to satisfy the legitimate interests of both the program and the dis-
abled person).
122. Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 491. The MHSAA had procedures in place for waivers of most
eligibility requirements, but not for the age requirement. Id.
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Rehabilitation Act, and therefore required a resolution of these com-
peting interests. 23 Finding that waiver decisions on a case-by-case ba-
sis would not destroy the age rule or its purposes, the district court
held that reasonable accommodation of the plaintiffs' disabilities
should be made by waiving the age requirements in this case. 124 Fur-
ther, the district court rejected the MHSAA argument that individual
consideration of such waiver requests would impose an undue burden
on the association and the schools. 125 It held that its decision was not
"universal" and must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, allowing
denial of a waiver if the plaintiff posed a safety risk or the waiver
would give the plaintiff a competitive advantage.1 26
After individual inquiry into the requested accommodation, the dis-
trict court held that participation in interscholastic sports was an "in-
tegral part of the education of the plaintiffs." It noted that Sandison
received better grades due to his participation and interaction with
teammates who "encouraged him to study and be disciplined," while
Stanley developed better social skills as a result of his participation on
the sports teams. 127
b. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the district court, focusing in-
stead on the effect that a waiver of the age requirement might have
upon competition by possibly providing a competitive advantage to
the disabled athletes. 128 Because a waiver of the age requirement
would constitute a fundamental alteration of the sports programs, the
Sixth Circuit held that this waiver could not be considered a reasona-
ble accommodation.'2 9 Further, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Title III
of the ADA claim, holding that the MHSAA was not a public accom-
modation. 130 Utilizing Title II of the ADA, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that the age requirement was a "neutral rule" with respect to disability
and, therefore, did not implicate the "solely by reason of disability"
123. Id. at 490.
124. Id. See also Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz.
1992) (holding that "individual inquiry is essential if the law is to achieve its goal of protecting
disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear").
125. Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 491.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 489.
128. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 1035.
130. Id.
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element of the ADA 13' because even absent their disabilities, the
plaintiffs still would not have satisfied the age requirement, making
them not "otherwise qualified."'' 32 Finding that the age requirement
rule was "necessary" and a waiver of this rule would "fundamentally
change the bright-line age restriction," the Sixth Circuit held that
waiver of such a rule could not be considered a "reasonable
accommodation." 33
The Sixth Circuit also found persuasive the MHSAA argument that
individual consideration of such waiver requests would pose an undue
burden, holding that such considerations would
require high school coaches and hired physicians to determine
whether these factors render a student's age an unfair competitive
advantage. The determination would have to be made relative to
the skill level of each participating member of opposing teams and
the team as a unit. And of course, each team member and the team
as a unit would present a different skill level.1 34
However, the individual inquiry considered burdensome by the court
would only be applied to those disabled students requesting a waiver
because of their disabilities. 35
In contrast to the Sandison decision, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a similar waiver
request did not fundamentally alter the nature of the program, con-
cluding that waiver of the rule in question was a reasonable modifica-
tion for the disabled athlete.
131. Id. at 1032. See The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
132. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1033. However, the court failed to address that it was only because
of their disability that the plaintiffs found it necessary to obtain a waiver as a reasonable modifi-
cation of the rule.
133. Id. at 1037. The court applied its analysis in a general sense as opposed to an individual
inquiry, in direct conflict with the mandate of the ADA; it did not consider (as the district court
did) how an "individual" waiver in this case would affect the purpose of the age requirement
rule.
134. Id. at 1035. See also McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 462
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that individual inquiry would essentially require the high school athletic
association to determine a particular student's physical and athletic maturity).
135. See Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (M.D. Fla. 1995),
vacated as moot 102 F.3d 1172 (11 th Cir. 1997); Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic
Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated as moot 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating "[tihat it may prove difficult in some cases does not substantiate the claim that it would
be unduly burdensome or destructive of the purpose of the rule."). See also Julie Kasperski,
Comment, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasona-
ble Modifications under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 175, 193-94 (1997).
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2. Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Association 36
Eric Washington was a learning disabled high school student who
dropped out of school during the 1996-97 school year.137 He re-en-
rolled at Central Catholic High School the following year and sought
to participate in the school's basketball program.138 To gain eligibility,
Mr. Washington and Central Catholic High School sought a waiver of
the Indiana High School Athletic Association's (IHSAA) rule prohib-
iting participation in interscholastic sports after eight semesters (re-
gardless of whether the student is enrolled in school) following the
commencement of the ninth grade. 39 The IHSAA advanced that the
purpose of this rule was to "discourage redshirting,' 140 "promot[e]
competitive equality, protect[ ] students' safety, creat[e] opportunities
for younger students and promot[e] the idea that academics [we]re
more important than athletics.' 141 Central Catholic High School and
Mr. Washington requested a waiver under the IHSAA "hardship
rule" that allowed the Association to refuse enforcement of a rule if
strict enforcement in the particular case would not "serve to accom-
plish the purpose of the rule, the spirit of the rule would not be vio-
lated and there [was] no showing of undue hardship in the particular
case. 1 42 The IHSAA denied the waiver request and Mr. Washington
filed a claim under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. 143
a. The District Court
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indi-
ana focused on two lines of inquiry: first, "whether the rule itself,
without reference to the particular individual [was] generally funda-
mental and essential,"'1 44 and second, "whether the individual waiver
requested would do damage to the purposes behind the rule."' 145 The
district court subsequently granted preliminary injunctive relief
against enforcement of the eight semester rule, holding that the re-
136. 181 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1999).
137. Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1999).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. "Redshirting is the practice of slowing a student's academic pace and postponing his
initial participation in competitive athletics in order to permit him to gain physical and athletic
maturity before beginning his period of eligibility for competitive athletics." Id. n.2.
141. Id.
142. Washington, 181 F.3d at 843. The IHSAA already had a procedure in place to waive such
requirements, yet chose not to follow that procedure. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 843-44.
145. Id. at 844.
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quested waiver was a "reasonable modification of the IHSAA's
rule"' 146 because the waiver would not constitute a conflict with the
purposes of the rule. 47 The district court concluded that Mr. Wash-
ington had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits with respect to his claims under Title II of the ADA and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act by establishing: a) he suffered from a
disability; b) he was "otherwise qualified" to participate in the activ-
ity; and c) he was excluded from playing basketball because of his
disability.' 48 The district court also rejected the IHSAA undue hard-
ship argument, finding that Mr. Washington was the first student in
over fourteen years to request such a waiver. 149
b. The Court of Appeals
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the district court ruling, holding that Mr. Washington had established
the discrimination "by reason of his disability" element' 50 and that he
was a "qualified individual" under Title II of the ADA.15 ' Mr. Wash-
ington did not have to establish that the discrimination he faced was
intentional, because even facially neutral "rules" may have a disparate
impact 152 and failure to modify these neutral rules may be proof of
discrimination under Title II of the ADA. 53 The analysis turned on
whether "waiver of the rule, in the particular case at hand would be so
at odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a funda-
mental and unreasonable change,"'' 54 or whether modification of the
146. Id. at 843.
147. Id. at 844. The record indicated that there had been no redshirting, and that Mr. Wash-
ington's participation in athletics had increased his self-esteem and his academic achievement,
thereby resolving the conflict between the waiver request and the purpose of the rule. Washing-
ton, 181 F.3d at 844.
148. Id. at 843. Subsequently, the court rejected the claim under the Rehabilitation Act be-
cause Mr. Washington failed to establish that the IHSAA was the recipient of federal funds. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 848-49 (holding that but for his learning disability, Mr. Washington would not have
dropped out of school his junior year and would have been eligible to play).
151. Id. at 849-52. See also The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994)
[Q]ualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of ar-
chitectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids
and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
Id.
152. Washington, 181 F.3d at 848. See also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir.
1996).
153. Washington, 181 F.3d at 848.
154. Id. at 850. See also Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931
(8th Cir. 1994) (Arnold, C.J. dissenting); Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Confer-
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rule would create an undue financial or administrative hardship. 55
Concluding that individual inquiry was most consistent with the con-
gressional intent underlying the ADA, the Seventh Circuit found sup-
port in cases involving employment discrimination claims under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which required individual analy-
sis on a case-by-case basis.156 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that
ADA regulations similarly require individualized analysis. 157 Moreo-
ver, the Seventh Circuit found that focusing on the general purposes
behind a rule, without considering the effect a waiver for a disabled
person would have on the rule's purposes, "would negate the reason
for requiring reasonable exception." 158 As applied to Mr. Washing-
ton, the grant of a waiver to allow participation would not frustrate
the purposes of the eight semester rule because the evidence did not
establish that "redshirting" would provide Mr. Washington with a
competitive advantage over other athletes or that athletics were val-
ued over academics.159 Furthermore, the record did not support the
argument that individual inquiry into waiver requests would place an
undue financial or administrative burden on the IHSAA; the few case-
by-case analyses potentially required could not be described as an ex-
cessive burden. 60
ence, 913 F. Supp. 663, 668-69 (D. Conn. 1995): Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n,
899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot 102 F.3d 1172, 1173 (11th Cir. 1997).
155. Washington, 181 F.3d at 850. See also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 288 n.17 (1987); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979): Mc-
Pherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 119 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1997).
156. Washington, 181 F.3d at 851 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, holding that determining
whether a plaintiff is otherwise qualified for a job requires an individualized inquiry if section
504 is to "achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on
prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate
concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks").
157. Id. at 851 n.14 (citing the appendix to Title II of the ADA regulations which relies on the
Supreme Court recognition in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline that there is a need to
balance the interests of people with disabilities against the legitimate concerns for public safety.
and that a person who poses a significant risk will not be considered "qualified" if reasonable
modifications would not eliminate that risk). However,
the determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others
may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particular
disability. It must be based on an individualized assessment ...Such an inquiry is
essential if the law is to achieve its goal ....
28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A (Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disabil-
ity in State and Local Government Services).
158. Washington, 181 F.3d at 851.
159. Id. at 852.
160. Id. at 851. The IHSAA already conducted individual analyses regarding whether physi-
cally impaired student athletes should receive waivers. Id. at 852.
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3. Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association' 6'
Michael Bowers, a highly talented high school football player, diag-
nosed as learning disabled in the second grade, attended special edu-
cation classes throughout high school. 162 Because of his talent on the
football field, Mr. Bowers was heavily recruited by several colleges
and universities to play scholarship intercollegiate football. 163
Although Mr. Bowers applied one year earlier for National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) certification granting him "qual-
ifier status" by the NCAA Clearinghouse, 164 he did not receive
notification of his "non-qualifier status" until July 30, 1996, less than
one month before he was to begin classes on full scholarship at Tem-
ple University. 165 The NCAA eligibility criteria for competition in in-
tercollegiate sports programs required a student to apply for and
receive "qualifier status," based in part on the academic "core" classes
successfully completed in high school. 166 As a result of the denial of
"qualifier status," Mr. Bowers lost his full athletic scholarship and op-
portunity to participate in the Temple University football program. 67
a. The District Court
In May, 1997, Mr. Bowers sought preliminary injunctive relief
under the ADA, seeking revision of his ineligible status. 68  The
United States District Court of New Jersey requested that the NCAA
consider whether Mr. Bowers was entitled to a waiver of the freshman
eligibility rules. 169 The NCAA Subcommittee 70 considered "whether
[Bowers] would be able to succeed academically during his first year
of college while also confronting the demands of participating in an
intercollegiate sports program" within the context of the purpose of
161. 118 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D.N.J. 2000); Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998); Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 460
(D.N.J. 1997).
162. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
163. Id. (noting that the recruiting institutions included University of Iowa, Temple Univer-
sity, and American International College).
164. Id. at 468. The NCAA delegates authority to the NCAA Clearinghouse, a division of the
American College Testing Service, to determine the eligibility of students for participation in
collegiate sports and receipt of athletic scholarships during their freshman year. Bowers, 974 F.
Supp. at 461 n.2.
165. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
166. Id. at 468.
167. Id. at 468-69.
168. Id. at 466.
169. Id.
171). The NCAA Subcommittee was comprised of four experts in special education. Id. at 463.
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the eligibility rule 171 and determined that Mr. Bowers would not be
able to succeed academically. 172
Subsequently, the district court denied Mr. Bowers' request for in-
junctive relief, holding that he did not establish a reasonable likeli-
hood of success on the merits. 173  The district court held that the
NCAA eligibility requirements did not unfairly exclude disabled stu-
dent athletes, and the waiver process and provisions provided ade-
quate accommodation and alternatives for those athletes. 174  The
NCAA eligibility requirements were essential to "maintain intercolle-
giate athletes as an integral part of the educational program and to
assure that those individuals representing an institution in intercollegi-
ate athletic competition maintain satisfactory progress in their
education." 175
The district court concluded that Mr. Bowers' request to consider
his special education classes as "core" classes did not simply seek to
modify the rule; it sought to virtually eliminate the "core" course re-
quirement. 176 To grant this request would have exceeded the scope of
the ADA, which requires "even-handed treatment of individuals with
disabilities 1' 77 but "does not require the NCAA to simply abandon its
eligibility requirements."'1 78 Therefore, the district court held that "a
complete abandonment of the 'core course' requirement would funda-
mentally alter the nature of the privilege of participation in the
NCAA's intercollegiate athletic program. ' 179 The NCAA successfully
171. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 463-64.
172. Id. at 466. The Clearinghouse determined that, even with the principal's certification,
"[s]tudents in [special education] courses are expected to acquire the same knowledge, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, as students in comparable course(s)." Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at
469. Bowers "lacked two years of social studies, three years of English, and the requisite addi-
tional core courses." Id. Bowers was given core course credit for only three of his high school
courses. Id. at 467.
173. Id.
174. Bowers, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 521-23. The Bowers court held that even though the NCAA
rules expressly excluded special education classes from consideration as "core" classes, the by-
laws considered as a whole provided two alternative routes by which a learning disabled student
could obtain "qualifier status." Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 468. This "status" could be obtained
either by 1) the student's high school principal certifying that the student obtained equivalent
knowledge as students completing core courses; or 2) the student presenting evidence that the
student's overall academic record merits the waiver of the core classes requirement. Id. Bowers
availed himself of both alternatives, without success. Id. at 469.
175. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 466.
176. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
177. Id. (citing Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1031 (6th Cir.
1995)).
178. Id. (citing Garden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, No. 96-6953, *16 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 21, 1996)).
179. Id. at 467.
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defended its position against the ADA claim by performing the essen-
tial function of individual inquiry of the particular circumstances of
the disabled individual. As such, the NCAA proved that Mr. Bowers'
request, as applied to him, would fundamentally alter the purpose of
the freshman eligibility requirement. 180
In addition to high school and collegiate sports, the ADA has appli-
cation in the world of professional athletics.
4. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. 181
Casey Martin is a highly skilled professional golfer who suffers from
Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome, 182 a congenital circulatory disorder that
renders him unable to walk an eighteen-hole golf course without sig-
nificant pain and risk of injury. 183 Despite the pain, Mr. Martin can
perform all the essential functions required during a round of golf,
with the exception of walking to the golf ball while it is in play. 84 In
1997, Mr. Martin entered the PGA's three-round qualifying school in
an attempt to gain playing privileges on the PGA Tour. 85 He ad-
vanced through the first and second stages of the qualifying school
using a golf cart. 86 Pursuant to the PGA's "no-cart" rule, the third
round of the qualifying school required golfers to walk the entire eigh-
teen-hole round. 87 Mr. Martin requested that the PGA waive the
"no-cart" rule as a reasonable modification in light of his disability,
but was denied the waiver. 188 Mr. Martin then sought permanent in-
junctive relief under Title III of the ADA to enjoin the PGA from
enforcing the "no-cart" rule, making tournaments, such as the qualify-
180. Id. Subsequently, the NCAA signed a consent decree in May 1998 with United States
Department of Justice agreeing to modify the core course requirements as applied to learning
disabled students. See http://www.usdoj.gov.crt.ada.ncaa.htm; http://www.u.doj.gov.crt/ada/
ncaafact.htm (settlement fact sheet).
181. 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998); 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998).
182. Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome is a rare congenital disease marked by excessive growth of
soft tissue and/or bones with venous malformations and lymphatic abnormalities usually affect-
ing one limb. No cure exists, but treatment may include wearing an elastic garment on the
affected limb to protect the limb from trauma and decrease the chance of bleeding from the
vascular abnormalities. Description of KlippeI-Trenaunay Syndrome, at http://www.k-t.org/
description.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2001).
183. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
184. Id. at 1243.
185. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1322. Qualifying school is a three-stage tournament to qualify for
playing privileges on the PGA Tour or the Nike Tour. Id. To enter qualifying school, a player
must present a $3000 entrance fee and two letters of recommendation. Id. Golf carts are per-
mitted in the first two rounds of qualifying school. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
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ing school and the PGA Tour events, accessible to individuals with
disabilities. 89
a. The District Court
The United States District Court of Oregon considered Mr. Mar-
tin's claims under Title III of the ADA, holding that the PGA Tour
was a public entity operating a place of public accommodation,
thereby subjecting it to ADA regulation. 190 The district court held
that Mr. Martin's request for the use of a golf cart was a reasonable
accommodation that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
PGA's golf tournaments.191
The district court first considered whether the PGA operated a
place of public accommodation at the golf courses where it held its
tournaments. 92 Although reasoning that the general public was not
allowed "inside the ropes" of the players' competition area, the dis-
trict court found that the greens and fairways of the golf courses were
nonetheless public accommodations under the ADA. 193 The district
court also determined that the PGA was not a private club for ADA
purposes, and therefore was required to comply with ADA standards
for public accommodations when it operated its tournaments. 194 Find-
ing the PGA to be a private commercial enterprise, the district court
analyzed the PGA's status under an abbreviated seven factor analysis
used in Civil Rights Act jurisprudence' 95 to determine if it was also
exempt from the scope of the ADA. 196 The district court found that
eligibility requirements were based on skill and were not designed to
screen members based on freedom of association values. 197 Players
and members were not voted in by current members; instead, they
"played their way in."' 198 The PGA was found to be a bona fide or-
189. Id. Temporary injunctive relief was granted to allow Martin to compete in the third
round of qualifying school with a golf cart. Id. His score qualified him for a position on the
PGA sponsored Nike Tour. Id.
190. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
191. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1253.
192. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326.
193. Id.
194. Id. See The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, 12187 (1994).
195. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 (analyzing the PGA status by evaluating 1) genuine selectiv-
ity; 2) membership control; 3) the history of the PGA; 4) the use of PGA facilities by non-
members; 5) the PGA's purpose; 6) advertising for members: and 7) whether the PGA is non-
profit). See United States v. Landsowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 796-97 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(setting forth factors to determine if an establishment maintains public or private status for the
purposes of determining its exemption from the Civil Rights Act).
196. See The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994).
197. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
198. Id.
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ganization that was not formed to evade ADA requirements because
it was in existence prior to the enactment of the ADA.199 The PGA's
reliance on revenues generated by non-members, such as vendors, re-
porters, scorekeepers, volunteers, and the public, established that
PGA facilities were used by non-members.2 0 0 The PGA was formed
for the commercial purpose of promoting and operating golf tourna-
ments to the economic benefit of its members.20' Because the PGA
was extensively covered by the media through its tournament events,
it did not actively advertise for members.20 2 Finally, the district court
found that the PGA existed for purely "mercantile" purposes, even
with its non-profit status. 20 3 The factors established that the PGA was
a public entity operating a public accommodation; therefore, the PGA
"no-cart" rule was subject to Title III scrutiny.20 4 Thus, the PGA was
required to make reasonable accommodations providing access to dis-
abled individuals, unless it could establish that such accommodation
would fundamentally alter the nature of its program. 20 5
Casey Martin's disability was undisputed. 20 6 Therefore, the district
court analyzed the reasonableness of the request for use of a golf cart,
holding that reasonableness was determined in the "general sense,
that is, in the general run of cases. ' 20 7 The burden of proof was then
on the PGA to establish that modification of the "no-cart" rule would
constitute a fundamental alteration to the nature of its program.208
The district court analyzed the walking requirement in terms of
whether walking was an essential requirement of professional golf.209
Because the ADA required individual assessment of the accommoda-
tion in terms of the disabled individual, the district court considered
199. Id. at 1323-24.
200. Id. at 1325.
201. Id. at 1323.
202. Id. at 1325.
203. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-25.
204. Id. at 1326-27.
205. Id. at 1327.
206. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244.
207. Id. at 1248 (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997), where
the Fifth Circuit required a brewery owner to allow a blind individual's guide dog to accompany
the individual on a public brewery tour as a reasonable modification of the brewery's policies to
permit access by disabled persons with guide dogs). The court noted that the PGA allows golf
carts in other tournaments, such as the Senior Tour and the first two rounds of qualifying school.
Id. Moreover, the NCAA and Pac 10 Athletic Conference allowed use of golf carts to accommo-
date disabled collegiate athletes. Id.
208. Id. at 1249.
209. Id. at 1249-53.
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whether walking was necessary in professional golf competition, 210
and whether modification of the "no-cart" rule for Casey Martin
would fundamentally alter the nature of the game played at PGA
Tour tournaments.211 The purpose of the "no-cart" walking rule ad-
vanced by the PGA was to inject a fatigue factor into competitive
golf.212 Relying on the testimony of Dr. Gary Klug, a physiologist
specializing in the study of fatigue, the district court held that the
PGA's asserted "fatigue factor due to walking" was insignificant. 21 3
The district court rejected the argument that the fatigue factor was
caused by walking in the tournament under normal circumstances, 21 4
holding that stress and motivation to win are the key ingredients con-
tributing to fatigue during the course of play.215 The district court also
found that even with the use of a golf cart, Mr. Martin must walk
twenty-five percent of the golf course, enduring significant pain, be-
cause the golf cart often could not be driven to the ball.216 Therefore,
the district court concluded that Casey Martin's use of a golf cart dur-
ing tournament play would neither frustrate the purpose of the "no-
cart" rule nor fundamentally alter the nature of professional golf
competition.21 7
b. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the ruling of the lower court, affirming that the PGA oper-
ated a place of public accommodation, which subjected it to ADA
regulation. 218 The Ninth Circuit rejected the PGA's argument that
the competitive playing area "inside the ropes" was exempt from
210. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1249 (finding that the Rules of Golf did not require walking and
that the PGA had previously waived the "no cart" rule in other tournaments; therefore, the
court concluded that walking was not an essential part of the competition).
211. Id. at 1250.
212. Id.
213. Id. Dr. Klug testified that the calories expended walking an eighteen-hole round of golf
was less than was found in a Big Mac sandwich. Id. But see, infra note 315 (discussing the
exclusion of Dr. Klug's testimony from the Olinger v. United States GolfAss'n proceedings).
214. Id. at 1250-51 (relying on testimony by Dr. Gary Klug, professor of physiology at the
University of Oregon, who testified that walking in competitive golf is not physiologically taxing
and does not create an appreciable measure of fatigue). PGA witness and 1964 U.S. Open win-
ner, Ken Venturi testified that the principal cause of fatigue in PGA golf is mental stress caused
by the pressure of competition. Respondent Brief to the Supreme Court at 39, PGA Tour, Inc.
v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). Mr. Venturi and other PGA witnesses who testified that riding
in a golf cart reduces a perceived fatigue factor admitted that "they were speaking generally
about able-bodied hypothetical golfers and not about Mr. Martin." Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
215. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251.
216. Id. at 1251-53.
217. Id. at 1253.
218. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000).
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ADA regulation and held that the "underlying premise of the cases
dealing with disabled student athletes is that Title III applies to the
playing field, not just the stands. ' 219 Analyzing the reasonableness of
the accommodation requested, the Ninth Circuit found that provision
of a golf cart to Mr. Martin was reasonable because it provided him
access to the competition, access that was provided in other competi-
tions and, as a practical matter, was not difficult to administer.220
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court ruling that walking
was not an essential part of the game of golf.2 21 After individual in-
quiry, the Ninth Circuit held that use of a golf cart by Mr. Martin
would not fundamentally alter the nature of the golf tournament. 222
The inquiry focused on the individual exception and, in light of the
plaintiff's individual characteristics, whether the purpose of the rule or
program would be fundamentally altered. 223 Also rejecting fatigue as
a significant factor in the competition, the Ninth Circuit held that
walking was not fundamental or essential to the competition; there-
fore, the use of a cart by Mr. Martin could not fundamentally alter the
nature of the golf competition. 224 Because walking was not essential
to the competitive game, a golf cart could not serve to provide Mr.
Martin with a competitive advantage over able-bodied, walking golf-
ers.2 25 As applied to Mr. Martin, who "endures greater fatigue even
with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking, [provision
of a golf cart] d[id] not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA
Tour's [competition]. ' 22 6 The Ninth Circuit further rejected the un-
219. Id. at 997-98 (citing Bowers, 9 F. Supp.2d at 483-90; Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 No. 96 C 6953 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) and holding that PGA
tournaments are not "mixed use" facilities).
220. Id. at 999.
221. Id. (citing Rule 1-1 of the Rules of Golf, "[the game of golf] consists in playing a ball from
the teeing ground into the hole by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with the Rules.").
222. Id. at 1001. See also School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987)
(holding individual inquiry is required under the Rehabilitation Act); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 632 (1998) (holding that the court is required "to construe the ADA to grant at least as
much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act").
223. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1002 (citing Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Assoc.,
40 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 1994) (Arnold, Judge dissenting)). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
2 at 102 (1990) (requiring public accommodations "to make decisions based on facts applicable
to individuals and not on the basis of presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabili-
ties can or cannot do").
224. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001.
225. Id.
226. Brief to the Supreme Court for the Respondent at 11, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S.
Ct. 1879 (2001).
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due hardship argument,227 finding that the fact-based inquiry require-
ment would actually eliminate the flood of waiver requests and
potential litigation by disabled athletes that was feared by the PGA.22
8
c. The Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling,
holding that "Title III of the ADA by its plain terms, prohibits [the
PGA] from denying Martin equal access to its tours on the basis of his
disability. ' 229 The Court ruled that the ADA required the PGA to
consider Mr. Martin's individual circumstances and make reasonable
accommodations to allow Mr. Martin the equal opportunity to com-
pete in PGA Tour events, unless such accommodations would serve to
fundamentally alter the nature of the events. 230 PGA Tour events,
and presumably other professional sporting events, are encompassed
by the ADA because Title III of the ADA did not carve out excep-
tions for "elite" athletic events.231 Upholding the lower courts' find-
ing that the fatigue factor was less than persuasive in Mr. Martin's
individual circumstance, the Court found "walking at best peripheral
to the nature of the [PGA's] athletic events. '232 "A modification that
provides an exception to a peripheral tournament rule without impair-
ing its purpose cannot be said to 'fundamentally alter' the tourna-
ment. '233 Therefore, Mr. Martin should have been granted the waiver
that would have allowed him to compete in the PGA Tour events.
5. JaRo Jones v. United States Golf Association 234
JaRo Jones is a skilled senior golfer who was substantially limited in
his ability to walk due to Post Polio Syndrome with Progressive Neu-
romuscular Atrophy. 235 He was otherwise qualified to participate in
the qualifying rounds of the United States Senior Open Championship
227. Martin, 204 F.3d at 1002 (holding that nothing in the record established that an individu-
alized determination of Martin's condition would impose an undue hardship on the PGA).
228. Id. (noting that the "PGA has steadfastly declined to consider Martin's condition in ad-
hering to its position that permitting him to use a cart would fundamentally change its
competition").
229. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879. 1890 (2001).
230. Id. at 1893.
231. Id. at 1896-97. See also supra note 92 and accompanying text (ADA did not create ex-
ceptions by implication).
232. Id. at 1896.
233. Id. at 1897.
234. Order and Opinion, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN (W.D. Tex. 2000) (on file with author).
235. JaRo Jones v. United States Golf Ass'n, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN at 1.
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(U.S. Senior Open), sponsored by the United States Golf Association
(USGA).236
The USGA is a nonprofit association that publishes and promul-
gates the Rules of Golf.237 Pursuant to upholding the "ancient and
honorable tradition," the USGA did not allow the use of golf carts by
competitors in the U.S. Senior Open.2 38 However, nothing in the
Rules of Golf required a golfer to walk.2 39 The walking requirement
was imposed by the USGA Championship Committee and designed
to inject a fatigue factor into the tournament.240
Because of his disability, Mr. Jones requested a waiver of the walk-
ing rule from the USGA in 1998, 1999, and 2000, to allow him to com-
pete in the qualifying rounds for the U.S. Senior Open.2 4' The USGA
denied all three of his requests. 242 In May, 2000, Mr. Jones sought
injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, requiring the USGA to
allow him to use a golf cart in the U.S. Senior Open and its qualifying
rounds. 243
a. The District Court
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
first determined that Mr. Jones was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA. 244 As an operator of a public accommodation while conducting
its golf tournaments, the USGA was subject to the regulations of Title
III of the ADA. 245 The district court rejected the USGA argument
that public accommodation did not extend "inside the ropes," holding
that Title III applied to the playing field, as well as "outside the
ropes. '2 46 Moreover, the area "inside the ropes" was open to any
member of the public over the age of fifty who met the qualifica-
tions. 247 Even though the field was eventually winnowed to 156 posi-
tions for the U.S. Senior Open, the nature of the facility remained
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 9.
241. JaRo Jones, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN at 2.
242. Id. at 2.
243. Id. at 2-3.
244. Id. at 3.
245. Id. at 5-6.
246. JaRo Jones, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN at 6 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d
994, 998 (9th Cir. 1998); Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Ind.
1999)). See also The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994) (stating
that "golf courses" are one of the enumerated public accommodations).
247. JaRo Jones, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN at 5.
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unchanged. 248 The USGA also contended that the tournaments it
conducted were "mixed use" facilities.249 The district court rejected
this argument, holding that the ADA does not provide for "exempt
zones" in places of public accommodation. 250 Therefore, failure to
make reasonable modifications discriminated against Jones because
nothing in the rules required walking, and Jones established that a cart
was a reasonable modification to accommodate his disability by al-
lowing him access to the U.S. Senior Open and its qualifying
rounds. 251
To defend against the Title III claim, the USGA needed to prove
that accommodating Mr. Jones with a golf cart would constitute a fun-
damental alteration in the nature of the U.S. Senior Open. "The evi-
dence must focus[ ] on the specifics of [Jones'] circumstances and not
on the general nature of the accommodation. ' 252 Based on the evi-
dence presented and individual analysis of Jones' circumstances, the
district court held that "Jones' use of a cart would not give him an
advantage over other players that would fundamentally alter the com-
petition. '253 Moreover, the district court rejected the USGA argu-
ment that such individualized inquiry would become an administrative
burden. 254 The USGA received 3,050 applications to compete in the
U.S. Senior Open in 2000.255 However, between 1986 and 1998, the
USGA received only twelve waiver requests for all of the tourna-
ments it sponsored. 256 In order to be consistent with the Supreme
Court decision in Martin and to comply with the requirements of the
ADA, the USGA must allow Mr. Jones the use of a golf cart as he
seeks equal access to the U.S. Senior Open. 257
The decisions in the cases involving athletes raising claims under the
ADA provide a basis for future courts to determine whether a re-
quested modification is reasonable in terms of the circumstances of
the disabled athlete. However, some of the analyses used in the afore-
248. Id. (citing Martin, 204 F.3d at 999).
249. Id. at 6.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 11.
252. JaRo Jones, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN at 8-9 (citing Martin, 204 F.3d at 1001). See also
Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding individual inquiry
essential to determination of fundamental alteration).
253. JaRo Jones, Civil No. A-00-CA-278 JN at 9. Moreover, this court was critical of the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Olinger v. United States Golf Association, finding that the Olinger
court did not conduct the individual inquiry required by the mandate of the ADA. Id. at 10.
254. Id. at 11.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
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mentioned cases were applied inconsistently in Olinger v. United
States Golf Association.
III. THE PARTIES
A. Ford Olinger
Ford Olinger is a highly skilled thirty-three year-old professional
golfer who achieved professional status in 1988 and attempted to qual-
ify for the 1998 and 1999 United States Open Golf Championships
(U.S. Open). 258 Mr. Olinger suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis
in both hip joints, a disability that significantly impairs his ability to
walk 259 and causes him "excruciating pain in the knee and lower
back. '2611 Mr. Olinger is also at significant risk of fracture when he
uses his legs to walk. 261 Mr. Olinger underwent surgery to graft his
fibula in an attempt to repair his left hip but achieved limited
success.
2 6 2
Despite the progressive nature of this disease, Mr. Olinger remains
eligible or "otherwise qualified" to compete for a berth in the U.S.
Open sponsored by the USGA. 263 To compete in this event, the golf-
ers are required to walk eighteen holes of the competition. 264 How-
ever, because of the severity of the degenerative disease affecting both
of his hips, Mr. Olinger was unable to walk the full eighteen holes
required to compete.265  Upon denial of the waiver, Mr. Olinger
258. Brief for the Appellant at 8, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926
(N.D. Ind. 1999) (on file with the author).
259. Id. Avascular necrosis results from the temporary or permanent loss of blood supply to
the bone tissue, resulting in collapse of the bone. Questions and Answers about Avascular Ne-
crosis, NATIONAL INSTITUTE or ARTHRITIS AND MUSCOLOSKELTAL AN1) SKIN DISEASES, at
http://www.nih.gov/niams/healthinfo/avnecqa.htm (last visited June 7, 2001). When this process
involves a bone near a joint, it leads to collapse of the joint surface, resulting in pain and arthritis
in that joint. Id.
260. Brief for the Appellant at 8, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926.
261. Id.
262. Id. Ongoing treatments vary for this disease based on the severity of the process, how-
ever treatment includes protection of the joint by limiting movement, prevention of further bone
destruction, and reduction of pain. Questions and Answers about Avascular Necrosis, supra note
259, at http://www.nih.gov/niams/healthinfo/avnecqa.htm. Mr. Olinger is required to take Ox-
ycontin, a medication used to treat cancer patients to alleviate moderate to severe orthopedic
pain. Oxycontin causes drowsiness and decreased functioning of the lungs. Brief for the Appel-
lant at 8, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
263. Brief for the Appellant at 8, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926
(N.D. Ind. 1999).
264. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
265. Id.
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sought injunctive relief to enjoin the USGA from enforcing its "no-
cart" rule.266
B. The United States Golf Association (USGA)
The USGA is a private, not-for-profit organization consisting of
nearly 800,000 individual members and more than 9,000 public and
private golf courses.267 The organization is "run by golfers for the
benefit of golfers. ' 268 A professional staff oversees the association's
day-to-day functions from its headquarters, The Golf House, in Far
Hills, New Jersey.269 The USGA depends on over 1,200 volunteers
from all over the country to coordinate the responsibilities of the or-
ganization.270 Founded in 1894 by five United States golf clubs,271 the
USGA continues to pursue its primary purpose: "to act in the best
interest of the game for the continued enjoyment of those who love
and play it." '272 Two functions served by the USGA are the sponsor-
ship of thirteen national championships and the development and
maintenance of the Rules of Golf.273 By the general consent of the
golf community, the USGA is regarded as the governing body of golf
in the United States.274 In cooperation with the Royal and Ancient
Golf Club of St. Andrews in Scotland, the USGA writes and inter-
prets the Rules of Golf "to guard the tradition and integrity of the
game. ' 275 Any changes in the governing rules must be jointly agreed
upon by the USGA and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club.276 In addi-
tion, the USGA publishes A Modification of the Rules of Golf for
Golfers with Disabilities to "allow the disabled golfer to play equitably
266. Id.
267. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, USGA MEMBERS PROGRAM 3 (2000).
268. United States Golf Association, About the USGA at http://www.usga.org/about/good of_
the_.game.html (last visited June 7, 2001).
269. Id.
270. See supra note 267, at 3.
271. The five charter golf clubs were Newport Golf Club, Shinnecook Hills Golf Club, The
Country Club (Brookline, MA), St. Andrew's Golf Club (Yonkers, N.Y.), and Chicago Golf
Club. United States Golf Association, Timeline at http://www.usga.org/about/timeline/index.
html (last visited July 14, 2001).
272. See supra note 267, at 3.
273. See supra note 267, at 4-6. The USGA also promotes amateur golf, maintains equipment
standards through research and technology, provides handicap and course rating systems, funds
turfgrass and environmental research, preserves golf's history, and ensures golf's future through
its foundation. Id. at 4-9.
274. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929. See also United States Golf Association, About the USGA
at http://www.usga.org/about/good of the-game.html (last visited June 7, 2001).
275. United States Golf Association, About the USGA at http://www.usga.org/about/good-of_
the-game.html (last visited June 7, 2001).
276. USGA MEMBERS PROGRAM, supra note 267, at 6.
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with an able-bodied individual or golfer with another type of
disability. '27 7
C. The United States Open Golf Championship
One of the tournaments sponsored by the USGA is the United
States Open Golf Championship (U.S. Open). 278 Use of the word
"Open" emphasizes the competition's democratic qualifying pro-
cess. 279 The process of narrowing the competitors to the ultimate field
of 156 players involves two qualifying rounds for non-exempt play-
ers.280 To be considered for participation in the local qualifying
rounds, participants must either have professional status or carry a
certified handicap index of 1.4 or lower as an amateur.28' Local eigh-
teen-hole qualifying rounds are conducted at ninety sites nationwide,
producing 750 competitors to advance to the sectional rounds. 282 Sec-
tional qualifying rounds, played at twelve sites around the country,
consist of thirty-six holes of golf played on a single day.283 At the
277. UNrED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, A MODIFICATION OF THE RULES OF GOLF FOR
GOLFERS WITH DISABILITIES 3 (1997) [hereinafter MODIFICATION OF THE RULES].
278. Stephen Goodwin, The Evolution of the Open, 2000 U.S. OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP 128
(2000). For the first half of the U.S. Open's one hundred year history, it was called the "National
Championship." Id.
279. Id.
280. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (stating that exempt status can be obtained by card-carry-
ing professional players). In fact, 7,117 golfers vied for the 156 playing positions in 1998. Id.
Categories for exemption for the 2001 U.S. Open include:
Winners of the U.S. Open Championship for the last 10 years; Winner of the 2000 U.S.
Amateur Championship; Winners of The Masters for the last five years; Winners of the
British Open Championship for the last five years; Winners of the PGA of America
Championship for the last five years; Winner of the 2001 Players Championship; Win-
ner of the 2000 U.S. Senior Open Championship; From the 2000 U.S. Open Champion-
ship, the 15 lowest scorers and anyone tying for 15th place; From the 2000 final official
PGA Tour money list, the top 30 money leaders; From the 2000 final official PGA
European Tour money list, the top 15 money leaders; From the 2001 official PGA Tour
money list, the top 10 leaders through May 27; Any multiple winner of PGA Tour co-
sponsored events whose victories are considered official from April 26, 2000 through
the close of entries on April 3, 2001; Special exemptions selected by the USGA Execu-
tive Committee; From the 2001 official PGA European Tour money list, the top two
money leaders through May 28; From the 2000 final official Japan Golf Tour money list,
the top two money leaders, provided they are in the top 75 in the World Ranking at
that time; From the 2000-2011 final official PGA Tour of Australia money list, the top
two money leaders, provided they are in the top 75 in the World Ranking at that time;
From the current World Ranking, the top 50 point leaders as of May 28.
UNITE) STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, Exempt Players, 2001 U.S. OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP 24 (2001).
281. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 928. The handicap index is designed to provide golfers of
differing abilities the chance to compete against one another on relatively equal terms; it takes
into account the difficulty of the courses played and the average score of the golfer to compute
the golfer's handicap. USGA MEMBERS PROGRAM, supra note 267, at 7.
282. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
283. Id.
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local and sectional levels, as well as at the national championship, the
USGA sponsors the rounds at various golf courses and "occupies each
site for a limited time before, during and after the subject events. '284
In 1998, private clubs were used for over ninety-five percent of the 103
sites for local and sectional qualifiers.285 The 1998 U.S. Open was
sponsored by the USGA, which leased the Olympic Club in San Fran-
cisco for the event. 286
D. The District Court Ruling
The district court in Olinger looked to cases decided under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 to determine whether the modification re-
quest to use a golf cart was reasonable and whether it would serve to
fundamentally alter the nature of the activity.287 This analysis "[wa]s
easily transferable [sic] to the Title III [of the ADA] reasonable modi-
fications context," because both provisions contained very similar lan-
guage.28 8 Under the ADA, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
the general reasonableness of the requested modification. 289 Because
the use of a golf cart had become so widespread throughout the game
of golf290 and the Rules of Golf did not specifically prohibit the use of
a golf cart,291 the USGA did not challenge the reasonableness of Mr.
Olinger's request.292 The burden then shifted to the USGA to estab-
lish that the "modification would fundamentally alter the nature of
the public accommodation. '293 Prior cases held that the inquiry must
necessarily focus on specific circumstances of the parties as opposed
to reasonableness in general. 294 The public accommodation program
or activity requested to be modified in Olinger was not the game of
golf in general, but the competitive rounds of the U.S. Open.295
Therefore, the district court's inquiry centered around whether Mr.
Olinger's use of a golf cart in the qualifying rounds and the U.S. Open
would fundamentally alter the nature of U.S. Open competition. 296
284. Id. at 928.
285. Id. at 928-29.
286. Id. at 929.
287. Id. at 933.
288. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d t052, 1059 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
289. Id. at 934. See also Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1(159.
290. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059-60.
295. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
296. Id.
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The district court analyzed Mr. Olinger's claim under Title III of the
ADA by addressing whether the USGA and its events were places of
public accommodation within the scope of the ADA.2 97 Because Con-
gress chose to list places rather than events or activities as public ac-
commodations, the district court found that the USGA and the U.S.
Open were not places of public accommodation. 298 However, it also
found that the golf courses on which the USGA sponsored the U.S.
Open tournaments were within the scope of the ADA as places of
public accommodation. 299 Recognizing that Mr. Olinger did not seek
equal access to the USGA, but rather to the golf courses on which the
USGA conducts its tournaments, the district court held that for one
day in May each year, the USGA operates "[ninety] golf courses for
the local qualifying rounds and [twelve] golf courses for the sectional
rounds," 300 thereby restricting normal operations of those golf courses
during those days.3° 1 The USGA "exercise[d] substantial control over
the operations of the golf courses used in the local and sectional quali-
fying rounds and the championship rounds. ' 30 2 The district court re-
jected the USGA's argument that the golf courses it operated were
"mixed use" facilities with a Title III exempt area "inside the
ropes. ' '303 Analogizing this case to a series of cases addressing the
National Collegiate Athletic Association eligibility rules, the district
court held that the ADA regulations did not provide for a "private
enclave in a public accommodation. ' 30 4
The district court then focused on the reasonableness of Mr. Olin-
ger's request for the accommodation of a golf cart during competition,
holding that it constituted a reasonable request for modification in a
297. Id. at 931 (citing The Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182
(2000)).
298. Id. (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267, 1273 (7th Cir. 1993); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1998); Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football
League, 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (proposing that the USGA, like the Boy Scouts of
America, the youth hockey league, and the professional football league, is a membership organi-
zation and not a place of public accommodation)).
299. Id. (stating that "[t]he inquiry must focus on the place, not the event").
300. Id. at 931.
301. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
302. Id. at 932.
303. Id.
304. Id. (comparing the golfers in the events to athletes in the NCAA cases, the court did not
find that Title Ill was limited by the roped off competitive area, and nothing supported such a
finding). See also Bowers v. Nat'l College Athletic Assoc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483-90 (D.N.J.
1998); Tatum v. Nat'l College Athletic Assoc., 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1122-23 (E.D. Mo. 1998);
Ganden v. Nat'l College Athletic Assoc., No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. II1. Nov. 21,
1996) (holding that the NCAA exercised enough control over the athletic facilities, as places of
exercise and recreation and places of exhibition or entertainment, to make the NCAA an opera-
tor of the facilities and the competitors were the performers).
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"general sense" because the use of golf carts had become so "ubiqui-
tous," and the Rules of Golf did not forbid the use of carts.30 5 How-
ever, it also held that the USGA, as an operator of a public
accommodation, avoided provision of the "generally" reasonable
modification by establishing that use of a golf cart by Mr. Olinger
would fundamentally alter the nature of U.S. Open competition °.3 0 6
The final step of the district court's inquiry was to determine
whether the request was reasonable in Mr. Olinger's circumstances or
whether provision of a golf cart would fundamentally alter the nature
of competition in the U.S. Open.30 7 The fundamental alteration ques-
tion was analyzed from two perspectives: the purpose of the rule and
the administrative burden of modifying the rule.
First, the district court looked to the purpose of the walking rule
and whether provision of a golf cart would provide any competitive
advantage. 30 8 The USGA contended that the purpose of the walking
rule was to inject a "fatigue factor" into the competitive equation be-
cause the U.S. Open was not only a test of golf skill, but also a test of
stamina.30 9 The Rules of Golf empower the Committee in charge of
the competition to set forth the conditions for each event.3 1 0 Yet, the
Rules of Golf provide no specific prohibition on the use of golf carts
during competitive play; on the other hand, the Rules specifically ad-
dress other facets of the game, such as the maximum number of clubs
available to a golfer during a round, the design of golf balls used, and
the use of outside assistance. 3 1 The Rules of Golf relied upon by the
Committee ensure fairness in the competition by providing the
''unique aspect of golf that underscores the extent rules ensure the
305. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 934 (citing Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059 (proposing that the ADA
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the requested modification is reasonable in a general
sense)).
306. Id. (citing Johnson, 116 F. 3d at 1059 (proposing that the defendant must prove that the
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation, focusing on the
specific circumstances rather than reasonableness in general)).
307. Id. at 936.
308. Id. at 934-36.
309. Id. 935-36.
310. UNITED STArEs GOLF ASSOCIATION, RULES OF GOLF 33-1 (2000) [hereinafter RULES OF
GOLF]. See also RULES OF GOLF at Appendix 1 104 (defining use of transportation as "if it is
desired to require players to walk in a competition, the following condition is recommended:
'Players shall walk at all times during a stipulated round'").
311. RULES OF GOLF, supra note 310, at 4-4(a) (requiring no more than 14 clubs), 5-1 App. III
(describing design of golf balls), 14-2 (disallowing assistance to golfer by prohibiting caddie from
holding an umbrella to shield golfer from inclement weather or heating a golf ball, or positioning
a caddie in the line of play or the line of a putt).
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exact same conditions. ' 31 2 Moreover, the Rules of Golf dictate that
scores for rounds of golf are determined by the number of strokes
taken, and the "competitor who plays the stipulated round in the few-
est strokes is the winner. ' 313 The USGA contended that the walking
rule had been a condition of competition for the U.S. Open and quali-
fying rounds since the Open's inception in 1895, because "physical en-
durance and stamina of the competitors [we]re very important parts of
the test to which the competitors [we]re subjected in championship-
level golf competitions. ' 314
The district court relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. James M.
Rippe, founder and director of the Center for Clinical and Lifestyle
Research. 315 Dr. Rippe testified to his study of medical literature and
specific effects of fatigue, such as decreased hand-eye coordination
and decreased dexterity, and concluded that because walking golfers
expend significantly more calories, they experience more physiologi-
cal and heat-induced stress, leading to decreased cognitive and psy-
chomotor functions.316 However, Dr. Rippe's research involved only
able-bodied golfers, finding that the able-bodied golfer who rides in a
cart has a significant and unfair advantage over the able-bodied golfer
who walks.317 Dr. Rippe conceded that the competitive edge in any
given situation would be unmeasurable, varying with the extent of the
golfer's disability, temperature, humidity, terrain, and the number and
type of strokes. 318 However, the district court was persuaded that a
competitive edge, however slight, might exist. 319 Coupled with the
312. Brief for Appellee at 15, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D.
Ind. 1999).
313. RULES OF GOLF, supra note 310, at 3-1.
314. Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D.
Ind. 1999) (1998 application form stated: "[p]layers shall walk at all times during a stipulated
round").
315. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935. See also Brief for Appellee at 11, Olinger v. United
States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (stating Dr. Rippe was associate profes-
sor of medicine in cardiology and the Center was regarded as the leading walking research lab in
the United States for fifteen years). Dr. Klug, who testified at the Martin proceeding was ex-
cluded as unreliable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
316. Brief for Appellee at 11-12, Olinger v. United Stales Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926
(N.D. Ind. 1999).
317. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 936 (stating that a person who walks a golf course on an
average summer day expends the same amount of energy as one who runs eleven minute miles
for two and one-half hours; calculating the amount of time spent walking during a round of golf
at 1.1 minutes walking per stroke). But see Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1252
(D. Or. 1998) (stating that, even with a cart, Casey Martin still would walk twenty-five percent of
the course).
318. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 936.
319. Id.
[Vol. 51:125
2001] OLINGER v. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION 165
finding that only a small amount of competitive edge was necessary to
materially affect the outcome of the competition, this led the district
court to hold that use of the golf cart, while a "generally" reasonable
request, would fundamentally alter the nature of competition in the
U.S. Open.320
Further, the district court heard testimony from Ken Venturi, win-
ner of the 1964 U.S. Open. Mr. Venturi experienced significant fa-
tigue during the 1964 competition due to extreme heat and
humidity. 32' He contended that "physical and mental fatigue are inte-
gral parts of the game of golf, which affect the performance of golfers
in championship-level golf competitions. '322 However, Mr. Venturi's
fatigued victory came after playing thirty-six holes in the final day.
323
Beginning in 1965, the U.S. Open was conducted over four days, in-
stead of three, thereby eliminating the need for playing thirty-six holes
on the final day and ending the severe endurance test of the final
round.324 Based on Mr. Venturi's testimony, the district court con-
cluded that if Mr. Olinger were allowed to compete while riding in a
golf cart, he could eliminate stamina from the set of qualities tested in
the U.S. Open championship, thereby circumventing the purpose of
the walking rule. 325 The district court concluded by stating:
[T]he point of an athletic competition ... is to decide who, under
conditions that are about the same for everyone, can perform an
assigned set of tasks better than (not as well as) any other competi-
tor. The set of tasks assigned to the competitor in the U.S. Open
includes not merely striking a golf ball with precision, but doing so
under greater than usual mental and physical stress. The accommo-
dation Mr. Olinger seeks, while reasonable in a general sense,
would alter the fundamental nature of that competition. 326
The district court also analyzed the administrative burden that
would be imposed on the USGA by requiring the organization to de-
velop a system of individual inquiry to determine whether an appli-
cant truly would need a golf cart to compete, holding that such a
development was unnecessary.327 In addition to holding that the
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Brief for Appellee at 13, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D.
Ind. 1999). But see Washington v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 181 F.3d 840, 840 (7th Cir.
1999). Ken Venturi testified that fatigue primarily due to the stress and motivation to win. Brief
for Appellee at 13, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
323. Brief for Appellee at 13, Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D.
Ind. 1999).
324. SALVATORE JOHNSON, THE OFFICIAL U.S. OPEN ALMANAC 143 (1995).
325. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
326. Id. at 937-38.
327. Id. at 937.
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ADA required the court to make an individual decision concerning a
plaintiff, the district court acknowledged that it must also balance the
potential impact of the inquiry against the overall nature of the pro-
gram or activity. 328 Because the USGA had never used its rules or
discretionary decisions to give one player an advantage over another
and in fact had developed rules to "level" the playing field, the district
court held that all players must be bound by the same rules.329
E. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling330
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the district court ruling that provision of a golf cart to Mr. Olinger
during competitive golf rounds would serve to fundamentally alter the
nature of U.S. Open competition. Analyzing the evidence under a
clearly erroneous standard of review and finding "ample" support in
the record for the district court ruling, the Seventh Circuit rejected
Mr. Olinger's contention that the USGA did not present proof that,
under Mr. Olinger's personal circumstances, the use of a golf cart
would fundamentally alter the nature of the U.S. Open competi-
tion. 331 The Seventh Circuit held that the ADA did not require enti-
ties to change the basic nature, character, or purpose of the activity,
and that the walking rule served such a basic purpose.332 Particularly
persuasive was the testimony of Ken Venturi, discussing his 1964 vic-
tory at the U.S. Open under stifling conditions: "[I]f another competi-
tor would have been riding in a cart, there would have been a
'tremendous advantage to the other player,' Venturi said. '333 Venturi
also related the story of Ben Hogan, who won the U.S. Open walking
one year after a serious automobile accident that left him unsure if he
would ever again walk.3 34 The Seventh Circuit found this testimony
very persuasive because "it emphasize[d] the importance and tradition
of walking in championship-level tournament golf competition. '335
The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the administrative burden
that would be imposed on the USGA by requiring individual inquiry
into such requests, holding that it was unnecessary to require the
USGA to develop an entirely new system to evaluate such requests. 336
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
331. Id. at 1006.
332. Id.
333. Id at 1005-06
334. Id. at 1007.
335. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
336. Id.
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"The decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to
accommodate [Olinger] is best left to those who hold the future of
golf in trust." 337
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to Mr.
Olinger, vacating the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision and
remanding the case to be considered in light of the Supreme Court
decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.338
IV. ANALYSIS
Under Title III of the ADA, Ford Olinger sought an injunction to
direct the USGA to allow him the use of a golf cart during the com-
petitive rounds of the U.S. Open.339 While rejecting the USGA's ar-
gument that the playing area "inside the ropes" was exempt from
coverage by the ADA, the district court denied the injunction on the
grounds that use of a golf cart created a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the competition.340 Title III of the ADA requires that oper-
ators of public accommodations make "reasonable modifications in
policies, practices or procedures.., unless the entity can demonstrate
that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of such ... privilege .... "341 For Ford Olinger, the denial of injunc-
tive relief also denied him the equal opportunity to play in the U.S.
Open. Provision of a golf cart would have been a reasonable modifi-
cation, affording Mr. Olinger an equal opportunity to compete.
A. Does Title III of the ADA Apply to the USGA and
What is the Privilege at Issue?
The first step in the inquiry is whether the ADA applies to a given
entity. Title III of the ADA exempts private clubs or organizations
from coverage by the ADA.342 The Olinger court found that the
USGA, as a private organization, was nonetheless subject to the regu-
lations of the ADA.343 Based upon the seven factors relied upon by
the Martin courts, the USGA and the U.S. Open did not qualify for
private club status.344
337. Id.
338. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4150 (2001), see supra notes 229-
233 and accompanying text.
339. Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929-30 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
340. Id. at 932-38.
341. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
342. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (2000).
343. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 930-33.
344. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (discussing the Landsowne factors as
applied to the PGA). The eight factors include general selectivity, membership control, the his-
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The first two factors were not supported because the USGA, even
as a strictly private organization, is open for a membership fee to all
adults and children who wish to support the game of golf.345 Moreo-
ver, the USGA-sponsored U.S. Open competition is open to all golf-
ers who qualify based on their level of skill.346 The winnowing process
of the competition does not change the nature of the facility. The golf
course where the tournament is conducted becomes no less a public
accommodation simply because most of the competitors are elimi-
nated through the qualifying rounds.347 Moreover, USGA members
exert no control over future memberships or voting power, thereby
negating the freedom of association or selectivity element of private
status.3 48 Factor three looks to the history of the USGA and pre-
cludes a finding that the organization was formed to sidestep the
scope of the ADA. Further, the USGA does not qualify for private
status under factors five and six because it advertises for membership
in its publications and allows use of its facilities by non-members. 349
Attendance at USGA-sponsored events includes the competitors,
spectators, vendors, scorekeepers, and newsmedia personnel. 350 Even
the non-profit status of the USGA cannot qualify it as a private entity
exempt from ADA regulation.3 51 The district court, however, focused
not on the organization but on the place where the USGA sponsored
the event to determine the applicability of the ADA.352 Therefore, by
conducting the sponsored event at an enumerated public accommoda-
tion, the USGA and the U.S. Open, as private entities, were subject to
ADA regulations and required to make reasonable modifications to
allow access to disabled individuals, unless they could establish that
such modifications would create a fundamental alteration in the na-
ture of the competition or present an undue burden on the USGA.
Moreover, the district court correctly rejected the USGA conten-
tion that "inside the ropes" was exempt from ADA regulation, while
the golf course in general was subject to the regulations.353 As the
tory of the organization, the use of the facilities by non-members, the purpose of the organiza-
tion, the advertisement for members, non-profit status, and the formalities observed by the club.
United States v. Landsowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
345. USGA MEMBERS PROCRAM, supra note 267, at 12.
346. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
347. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2000).
348. USGA MEMBERS PROGRAM, supra note 267, at 3.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc.. 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 931 (N.D. Ind. 1998). See supra
notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
353. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 931. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 51:125
2001] OLINGER v. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION 169
district court found in Martin, "such a distinction would render the
private club exemption virtually irrelevant" by "relegat[ing] the ADA
to hop-scotch areas" and requiring the courts to demarcate zones
based on restricted access to the public.354 By narrowly construing
exceptions to the ADA, courts prevent organizations that are deemed
public entities or private entities with public aspects from defeating
the congressional intent of the ADA through simple designation of
certain areas as "members only. ' 355 Further, Title III of the ADA
does not restrict the definition of public accommodation to only those
portions of a public exhibition that are open to the general public.
This argument presumes that there is nothing public about the compe-
tition itself.356 However, the golf courses used for competitions re-
main golf courses throughout the competitions.357 Limited entry to a
part of a public accommodation does not deprive the entity of its sta-
tus as a public accommodation. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found
that many other places of public accommodation exist that are open
only to specific invitees. 358 For example, elite private universities re-
strict admissions to a select few who qualify. 359 However, such com-
petitive selectivity does not shield those universities from the scope of
the ADA.360
Once the district court determined that the USGA was subject to
ADA regulation, the next step in the inquiry was to identify the privi-
lege at issue.361 The district court correctly held that Ford Olinger did
not seek equal access to the USGA, but rather to the golf course on
which the USGA conducted the U.S. Open rounds. 362 However, the
USGA did not simply sponsor golf in general. It sponsored the highly
competitive men's national golf championship, the U.S. Open. This
very important distinction entered into the analysis because the dis-
trict court looked at the privilege sought to be exercised, not in terms
of the nature of and impact on the game of golf in general, but rather
354. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1326-27 (D. Or. 1998).
355. Id. at 1327.
356. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2000).
357. See The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(L) (1994) (listing golf
courses as places of public accommodation).
358. Martin, 204 F.3d at 998-99.
359. Id.
360. Id. However, section 12181(a) does not grant equal access to a place where a person is
not entitled to be, therefore a disabled spectator is not entitled to access "inside the ropes"
during a tournament. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(a) (2000).
361. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
362. See The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994). See also supra note
80 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA requirement that disabled persons be allowed
equal access).
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in terms of the nature of and impact on the game as played by the
finest players in the world, competing with the sole intent of winning
the coveted title and prize money.
After determining that an entity is subject to ADA regulation and
identifying the privilege sought to be accessed, courts must analyze
the requested modification in the context of the individual circum-
stances of the disabled person.
B. Individual Inquiry - Modification in this Case Does Not
Undermine the Purpose of the Rule
To determine the reasonableness of a requested modification, the
court must look to the underlying purpose of the policy or rule and
decide whether that purpose would be undermined by granting the
requested modification given the circumstances of the disabled plain-
tiff. This requires the court to focus on the particular disabled individ-
ual rather than a hypothetical disabled person. Individualized
opportunity involves examination on a case-by-case basis that focuses
on the specific factual situation.363 "[C]ourts must examine the pro-
posed alternative, [requested modification] in light of the purposes
underlying the rule. '364 Specifically, when looking to an alteration in
the rules of athletics, the inquiry must consider whether the rule is
substantive in defining who is eligible to compete or governing how
the game is to be played. 365 A substantive rule intends to, and poten-
tially does, influence the outcome of the event governed by the rule,
as distinguished from rules not intended to affect the outcome, such as
dress or decorum. 366 The Olinger court analyzed the requested waiver
of the "walking" rule in light of the purpose advanced by the
USGA.367 The purpose advanced for the rule was to inject a "fatigue
factor," thereby testing the stamina of competitors in the overall skill
of shot-making. 368 While finding that the use of a golf cart, "in a gen-
eral sense," was reasonable with respect to the competitive arena of
the U.S. Open, the court held that a golf cart might affect the outcome
of the event.369
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sandison v. Michigan High
School Athletic Association applied a similar analysis to the purpose of
363. TviE SI'ECi-RUM, supra note 98, and accompanying text.
364. Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in Interscholastic
Sports, 49 ALA. L. REV. 817, 882 (1998).
365. Martin, 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998).
366. Milani, supra note 364, at 882.
367. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 933-38.
368. See supra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
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the age requirements for high school competition, holding that the age
rule was essential to the sports program to provide a safe and level
playing field. 370 Therefore, a waiver of this essential or substantive
rule could potentially affect the outcome of the competitive event or
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition in high school ath-
letics. However, the Sixth Circuit did not consider the plaintiffs' disa-
bilities in the context of the purpose of that rule and, given these
plaintiffs' individual circumstances, the purpose of the age rule would
not be undermined.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington v. Indiana
High School Athletic Association also applied this analysis, with a dif-
ferent result. The Seventh Circuit evaluated the eight semester eligi-
bility rule in terms of whether a waiver of the rule, in that particular
case, would be so at odds with its purpose that it would constitute a
fundamental and unreasonable change. 37 ' Based on this plaintiff's
factual situation, and not simply similarly situated plaintiffs, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a waiver allowed Mr. Washington to participate
in the athletic program, yet did not frustrate the purpose of the rule.372
Mr. Washington was allowed to compete while maintaining a level
playing field for all of the athletes involved.373
At the collegiate level, the district court in Bowers v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Association considered the purpose of the "core
course" requirement for "qualifier status" or eligibility for the privi-
lege of participating in intercollegiate athletic programs. 374 This re-
quirement was not considered a leveling rule for eligibility, but rather
a non-discriminatory rule designed to ensure academic success at the
collegiate level.375 The district court required the NCAA to look at
Mr. Bowers' individual circumstances, such as the courses he attended
in high school to determine if those courses could possibly meet the
requirements set forth by the NCAA to help ensure collegiate aca-
demic success by the athletes. 376 Further, the NCAA provided alter-
natives to the "core course" requirement that would still uphold the
purpose of the rule.377 This individual inquiry, required by the ADA,
370. See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text.
371. Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 840 (7th Cir. 1999).
372. Id. at 853.
373. Id. at 853-54.
374. Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (D.N.J. 1998).
375. Id. at 468.
376. Id. at 468-69. See generally, supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 175 (describing the alternatives available); supra note 100 (discussing the
ADA standard that even essential rules or policies may be served by alternate means). Bowers
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 974 F. Supp. 459, 466 (D.N.J. 1997).
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took into account Mr. Bowers' circumstances and determined that he
was unlikely to succeed academically because he was unprepared to
meet the challenge of college-level classes.378 The district court held
that granting a waiver to Mr. Bowers in this circumstance would not
only provide a disservice to the purpose of the rule, but would likely
obliterate the rule.379
One question for Olinger remained: was walking a fundamental or
substantive rule for professional competitive golf, such that allowing a
disabled golfer to ride in a cart, as opposed to walking, could under-
mine the purpose of that rule? 380 More specifically, after individual
inquiry, would provision of a golf cart to Mr. Olinger undermine the
purpose of the "walking" rule? The USGA contended that the "walk-
ing" rule was substantive, designed to inject a fatigue factor into the
competitive equation. Therefore, it governed how the game was
played and potentially influenced the outcome of the U.S. Open. 381
However, the district court rejected Mr. Olinger's contention that if
walking were as essential to the game as purported, scores would actu-
ally go up as the round progressed due to the fatigue involved. 382
To support its contention, the USGA presented testimony from Dr.
James Rippe revealing that the able-bodied golfer riding in a cart en-
dured less fatigue than the able-bodied walking golfer.383 However,
Dr. Rippe also established that the amount of fatigue a particular
golfer would endure on any given day was variable and difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify.384 Variables such as heat, humidity, and ter-
rain could affect even able-bodied golfers in very different ways.
Without the ability to specify the amount of fatigue endured, it is
nearly impossible to establish with any degree of certainty that fatigue
quantifiably affects the final score or plays any substantive role in the
outcome of the competition. 385
378. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 468-69. See supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
379. Id.
380. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the essential/incidental distinction
in terms of fundamental alteration).
381. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
382. Olinger v. United States Golf Assoc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 935-36 (N.D. Ind. 1998). Pro-
fessional golfers' scores generally remain consistent throughout the eighteen holes, begging the
question, how can fatigue really affect the scores and the outcome.
383. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935-36.
384. Id. at 936.
385. The Olinger and Martin courts heard conflicting testimony regarding the impact walking
has on competitive golf. See Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 934-36; Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F.
Supp. 1242, 1244-53 (D. Or. 1998). The Olinger court excluded testimony heard by the Martin
court under the Daubert principle. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 933 n.4 (citing Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
[Vol. 51:125
2001] OLINGER v. UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION 173
The Olinger court did not consider that Ford Olinger had an extra
variable to contend with on any given day, his disability. Based on the
evidence presented, the Olinger court assumed that providing Mr.
Olinger with a golf cart would "remove stamina (at least a particular
type of stamina) from the set of qualities designed to be tested in this
competition. ' 386 However, individual inquiry into Mr. Olinger's cir-
cumstances would have revealed that he likely endures greater fatigue
because of his pain simply walking to and from the golf cart than a
healthy, walking Tiger Woods would endure even on a particularly
grueling day.387 This conclusion was reflected in the district court's
Martin decision, which stated that "the fatigue [Martin] endures just
from coping with his disability is undeniably greater than the fatigue
injected into tournament play on the able-bodied golfer by the re-
quirement that they walk from shot to shot. ' 388 However, even if the
district court in Olinger was correct in its conclusion that fatigue
played a role in the competitive equation of the U.S. Open, the pur-
pose of the USGA's "walking" rule would have been served through-
out the tournament by providing Mr. Olinger with the use of a golf
cart. The injection of the fatigue factor into Mr. Olinger's game was
accomplished before he ever stepped onto the golf course.
Moreover, the golf cart would not remove the mental stress in-
volved in a competitive round. Is it possible that the primary source
of fatigue endured by golfers at the professional level has less to do
with physical factors, such as heat and humidity, and everything to do
with mental stress? As Ken Venturi testified in Martin, the principal
causes of the fatigue endured in competition were an overpowering
motivation to win and the pressure of the competition. 389 Mental fa-
tigue may require greater concentration or focus as the round pro-
gresses. However, use of a golf cart would be unlikely to impact a
professional golfer's ability to focus. With or without a cart, the
mental fatigue would be the same, as the finest golfers in the world
are all vying for that coveted first place finish.
386. Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
387. The Martin court assumed that a disabled golfer was required to walk twenty-five percent
of course, even with a cart. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251. See also supra note 216 and accompa-
nying text.
388. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251.
389. Brief for Claimant, Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251. See also supra note 214 and accompany-
ing text.
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C. Fundamental Alteration - Provision of a Golf Cart Would Not
Fundamentally Alter the Outcome of the U.S. Open.
The final step in determining the reasonableness of a requested
modification requires analysis of whether the modification would fun-
damentally alter the nature of the privilege or the outcome of the
event. 39° When dealing with competitive sports, even the slightest ad-
vantage could fundamentally alter the outcome of an athletic contest.
The court in Sandison considered the nature of competitive sports in
light of the age requirement and determined that the advantage given
to older students by waiving the age requirement could be enough to
make the difference between winning and losing. 391 To prevent this
advantage would require a precise (and sometimes impossible) assess-
ment of the abilities of all other similarly situated athletes. The Su-
preme Court in Martin held that modification theoretically could
fundamentally alter a golf tournament in two ways: by altering an
"essential aspect of the game of golf that it would be unacceptable,
even if it affected all competitors equally" 392 (i.e. changing the diame-
ter of the hole) or by a more peripheral change that would nonethe-
less give the disabled golfer an advantage over able-bodied golfers.393
The Court held that a golf cart, in this individual circumstance, would
not fundamentally alter the PGA tournament in either way. 394
Competitive advantage was central to the Olinger court's inconsis-
tent analysis of the fundamental nature of the modification requested.
Wins and losses in professional golf are decided in a quantifiable mea-
sure; the golfer with the lowest score wins. However, it is nearly im-
possible to determine how much the unquantifiable factor of fatigue
would translate into a golfer's final score. Does this advantage trans-
late into a one stroke advantage? Possibly two strokes? The court
was persuaded that even a one stroke advantage could be crucial be-
cause of the small margin necessary to make a difference between
winning and losing and the fact that fatigue could play a central role in
the outcome of the U.S. Open.395
At this level of competition, the difference in the level of skill is so
slight that one missed or gained stroke per round could amount to a
win or loss and a difference in prize money of thousands of dollars. To
390. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
391. See Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
See also supra note 320 and accompanying text.
392. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1893 (2001).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Supra notes 2, 320 and accompanying text.
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maintain a fair standard, there must be a level playing field that is
absolutely equal in all circumstances of the competition. The USGA
and competitive golf are governed by a multitude of rules, attempting
to provide for virtually any contingency that may arise during compet-
itive play to assure that all competitors play under like circumstances.
Rules governing players' conduct include: what to do when the ball
comes to rest on a water sprinkler; 396 how to correct imperfections on
the green;397 and how to assess penalty strokes for violation of the
rules.398 In addition, the Rules of Golf governs allowable equipment,
including the number of clubs that may be carried during a round, 399
the size, weight, and composition of the balls used,40 0 and the type of
clubs used during a competitive round.40 1 These latter rules create a
level "laboratory" condition for the play of competitive golf, a sport
that can be decided by a matter of inches. For example, a slight miss-
hit could result in an inadvertent slice into the rough, 40 2 failure to
make the green in regulation, 40 3 or an extra putt, all of which could
add strokes to a competitor's final score. 40 4 However, if the ball
should take a lucky bounce, it may settle a few inches to the right or
the left in the "fairway, '40 5 allowing the player better control of the
next shot. This small advantage, or lucky bounce, of a few inches
could be the difference between winning and losing. However, all
professional golfers must play their ball where it lies,406 creating a
"level" playing field even when conditions are out of the golfers'
control.
The "level" playing field that the USGA sought to create with the
Rules of Golf included the injection of fatigue into the competitive
396. RULES OF GOLF, supra note 310, at 24-2.
397. Id. at 16-1(a).
398. Id. at 2-6.
399. Id. at 4-4
400. Id. at 5-1.
401. Id. at 4-1.
402. Rough is the deep grass on either side of the fairway, allowing the golfer less control of
the next shot and possibly requiring different club selection, different strategy or a different
swing. Joseph C. Dey, Golf, II. The Golf Course, at http://encarta.msn.com (last visited July 25,
2001).
403. Regulation generally means the number of strokes needed to reach the green and make
par. Par refers to the number of strokes necessary to reach the green plus two putts. Joseph C.
Dey, Golf, IV. Forms of Competition, at http://encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?ti=761570500&
sid=2 (last visited July 25, 2001).
404. Professional golfers learn and practice shot-making from all sorts of conditions, this skill
is one of the factors that allows them professional status.
405. The fairway is the main part of the golf course, a carefully manicured strip of land where
the grass has been cut to provide the golfer with a good playing surface for the ball. Joseph C.
Dey, Golf, IlI. The Golf Course, at http://encarta.msn.com (last visited July 25, 2001).
406. RULES OF GOLF, supra note 310, at 13-1.
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equation. However, the Martin and Jones courts were not persuaded
that injection of a fatigue factor, by requiring walking during competi-
tive rounds, was necessary to "level" the playing field or was actually
part of any competitive equation in the individual circumstances of
the cases heard. 407 Those disabled golfers entered the arena of com-
petition at a disadvantage. The provision of golf carts to the disabled
golfers simply attempted to "level" the playing field. The Martin
courts applied an empathetic focus and perspective to the analysis of
the case, placing themselves "in the shoes" of the disabled golfer.40
They considered that the nature and language of the ADA's prohibi-
tion of discrimination suggested that interpretation must also take into
account the "compassionate purpose" behind the ADA.40 9
In contrast, the Olinger courts, persuaded by Ken Venturi's compel-
ling testimony, found that waiving the "leveling" "walking" rule
would decrease the importance of conditions that affect a golfer's per-
formance, "but which lie beyond the golfer's ability to control - fa-
tigue born of hills, of heat, [and] of humidity. '410 The Olinger courts
did not consider that Ford Olinger endures more fatigue from shot to
shot, even with a cart, than his able-bodied competition forced to walk
on any given day, thereby rendering the fatigue factor moot in his
individual circumstance. Instead of using an empathetic understand-
ing of the context of Mr. Olinger's individual situation, the court ap-
plied an "apathetic disregard for the real world impact."'41 ' The
analysis used by the Seventh Circuit in Olinger was also in direct con-
flict with its analysis in Washington.412 Similar to the waiver of the age
requirement in Washington, the fatigue factor should have been evalu-
ated in the context of Mr. Olinger's individual circumstances, and it
should have been determined whether provision of a golf cart would
undermine the purpose of the rule, and therefore possibly fundamen-
tally alter the outcome of the event. However, as in Washington, if the
purpose of the rule can be maintained despite waiver of the rule, the
requested modification must be granted.413 Moreover, the laboratory
407. See supra notes 209-17, 253 and accompanying text.
408. Catherine Gage O'Grady, Tribute: Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable
William C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 4, 12 (2001).
409. O'Grady, supra note 408, at 18.
410. But see Brief to the Supreme Court for the Respondent, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S.
Ct. 1879 (2001) (noting that Ken Venturi testified in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. that stress and
motivation to win were "key ingredients in the "psychological phenomenon" of fatigue; walking
was an insignificant part of the fatigue equation). See also supra note 214 and accompanying
text.
411. O'Grady, supra note 418, at 14.
412. See generally supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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conditions in virtually every other part of the competition would be
maintained. The golf cart simply would have "leveled" the playing
field for Ford Olinger. The Olinger courts should have "walked" in
the shoes of the "disenfranchised outsider. ' 414 The Supreme Court in
Martin "walked" in the shoes of Mr. Martin, finding that "pure chance
may have a greater impact on the outcome of elite golf tournaments
than the fatigue resulting from the enforcement of the walking
rule." 415
Mr. Olinger and Mr. Martin are similarly situated; both professional
golfers have debilitating disabilities precluding them from walking an
eighteen-hole golf course for competitive events.41 6 Both players also
sought equal access to the competitive events by the use of a golf cart,
which was held by the United States Supreme Court in Martin to be a
reasonable accommodation that would not fundamentally alter the
nature of these events.417 In order to be consistent with the Supreme
Court holding in Martin, the Seventh Circuit must now reverse its rul-
ing and find that the USGA walking requirement, as it related to Mr.
Olinger, violated Title III of the ADA, and thereby require the USGA
to allow Mr. Olinger the opportunity to compete using a golf cart.418
Is it possible that the fundamental alteration that the Olinger courts
were actually concerned about was the alteration of the time-honored
tradition of golf? The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was very con-
cerned with the testimony of the legendary Ken Venturi about his
heat-exhausted victory in 1964 and about the legendary golfer, Ben
Hogan's "walking" victory at the U.S. Open just one year after a
debilitating automobile accident. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed the tradition of the late, great Payne Stewart,41 9 who used his
full name on his U.S. Open application because it "was the U.S.
Open." The Seventh Circuit seemed much more concerned with the
time-honored tradition of golf than the nature of the sport in the year
2000. While tradition most certainly holds a very important place in
414. O'Grady, supra note 408, at 25.
415. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1895.
416. See supra notes 182-189, 258-266 and accompanying text.
417. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897-98. But see supra notes 33 1-335 and accompanying text (citing
the Seventh Circuit holding in Olinger that the provision of a golf cart would fundamentally alter
the nature of the U.S. Open).
418. See generally PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
419. Payne Stewart, "one of the best known faces on the PGA Tour in recent years," due to
his trademark dress on the golf course of knickers, won the U.S. Open in 1991 and 1999. Stewart
won the 1999 U.S. Open in dramatic fashion on the final putt of the eighteenth hole on the final
day. Stewart died tragically in 1999 in a plane crash over South Dakota on his way to the tour
championship. Golf Online Player Profiles-Payne Stewart, at http://www.igolf.com/profiles/
profile.dbm?golfer-id=1064 (last visited July 25, 2001).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
our society, the ADA attempts to bridge the gap between the discrim-
ination that tradition may invoke and equal opportunity for all indi-
viduals. Tradition cannot be allowed to provide a cover for making
changes that will actually improve the game. 420 The USGA could
have maintained the tradition of golf, while still giving Ford Olinger
the opportunity to compete. In accord with their misplaced concern
for tradition, the Olinger courts recognized that while the USGA may
not have unfettered discretion in the making of the rules governing
the sport, it is acknowledged as the governing body of golf in the
United States and must be afforded great deference to preserve that
tradition.
The Olinger courts also considered the difficulty in assessing re-
quests to permit the use of a cart and held that such a requirement
would present an undue burden on the USGA.4 2 1 However, given the
small number of requests for waivers, the administrative burden
would be minimal at best. 422 The Martin court asked the same ques-
tion and held that nothing in the record established that such inquiry
would be an intolerable burden. 423 On the other hand, testimony per-
suaded the Olinger courts that virtually any player could get a note
from his doctor stating that the player was unable to walk due to a
specified condition, 424 which would require the USGA to establish
methods to conduct individualized inquiry into such requests. How-
ever, this is what is required of other entities under ADA standards. 425
The USGA should not be exempt from establishing criteria to evalu-
ate disabled persons on an individual basis. The USGA waiver pro-
cess could be amended to require an independent examination by a
physician of their choosing, verifying that the individual actually quali-
fies for the waiver requested. Coupled with establishing specific stan-
dards and criteria for the grant of a waiver, this process would satisfy
the individual inquiry mandate of the ADA without upsetting the
competitive balance.
420. Brain Pollock, Case Note and Comment: The Supreme Court Appeal of the Casey Martin
Case: The Court's Two Options - Martin's Hole-in-One or Olinger's Slice into the Bunker, 10
DLPAUL J. ARr & ENr. LAW 391, 440-41 (2001).
421. See supra notes 327-329 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text. Between 1986 and 1998, the USGA
received only 12 waiver requests for all the tournaments they sponsored. Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000).
423. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
424. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
425. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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V. IMPACT
Potentially, the aspect of the Olinger decision that could have the
greatest impact on competitive sports is the determination that the
competitive event, the U.S. Open, was operated at a place of public
accommodation, thereby subjecting the Rules of Golf to scrutiny
under ADA standards. Accordingly, any organization charged with
establishing and maintaining rules for a particular game or sport that
is conducted or operated in a place of public accommodation could be
required by a court to alter those rules to comply with ADA regula-
tions.426 This potentially takes the rule-making capabilities out of the
hands of the sport and places them in the hands of the courts. The
courts must then determine what rules are substantive, how much def-
erence should be afforded to those organizations that know their
sports the best, and how much deference should be afforded to tradi-
tion. The Olinger courts afforded great deference to the established
rules of competitive golf.
Critics of the Martin decision concocted outlandish applications of
the decision, such as requiring "spring loaded shoes for [disabled] bas-
ketball players or quarterbacks with sign language interpreters, ' 427 to
illustrate the possibility of opening the flood gates to requests for
modifications of the rules and ADA litigation. Courts must tread with
care so as not to open those floodgates. Given the severity of Mr.
Olinger's and Mr. Martin's disabilities, it should not be overly difficult
to conclude that permitting them to ride in golf carts in competition
would not fundamentally alter the level playing field established by
the Rules of Golf. However, the truly difficult cases for courts would
be more marginal cases or those involving different requests for modi-
fications. For example, provision of a golf cart to the hypothetical dis-
abled professional golfer with a less severe disability than Mr. Olinger
(one that does not limit the ability to walk) could lead to that golfer
gaining a slight advantage over able-bodied golfers, thereby allowing
the ADA to fundamentally alter the nature of competitive profes-
sional golf. The difference herein lies with the fact that the provision
of golf carts to Mr. Olinger and Mr. Martin is necessary to provide
equal access to tournament play; it is not simply a means to make the
play more comfortable or less difficult.428 Consider also requests for
modifications of the rules governing the use of specific golf balls or
requests to play on shorter courses because a specific disability would
426. See Casey Martin's Ride, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 15, 1998 at G2.
427. John Garrity, Taking One for the Team, SPORTS It LUSTRATE D, Feb. 23, 1998 at 63.
428. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1890 (2001).
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not allow play by the current rules. The court would then need to
determine whether the rule requested to be modified was indeed sub-
stantive and whether modification would fundamentally alter or affect
the outcome of that competition. However, if the request is not quan-
tifiable, it may be nearly impossible to determine with any accuracy
whether any advantage would be given to that golfer in those circum-
stances. Professional sports add another dimension and are especially
difficult to analyze because of the high level of skill or mastery of the
competitors, making many of the players virtually equal on any given
day. The mere possibility of a slight advantage may be enough to al-
low the modification to fundamentally alter or change the outcome of
the event. In professional sports, not only is winning or losing at
stake, but there is generally substantial prize money at stake as well.
The challenge for courts analyzing the ADA in competitive situa-
tions is not dealing with the outlandish examples, but instead is bal-
ancing the notion of fairness of competition with the ADA's
fundamental goal of providing full participation to the disabled. De-
spite the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate, many sports still dis-
criminate against disabled individuals. Some situations are easily
remedied, such as modifying the starting procedure in swimming com-
petitions to use a strobe light instead of the traditional starting gun to
accommodate the hearing-impaired competitive swimmer.
The more difficult problem arises when courts attempt to demarcate
the point between accommodating the disabled athlete and funda-
mentally altering the nature of the competitive activity, which could
potentially change the outcome of the event. When the individual in-
quiry requires courts to measure unquantifiable factors, competitive
settings add an extra aspect to the analysis because accommodations
that give even the slightest advantage to the disabled competitor alter
the level playing field and upset the balance that courts must attempt
to attain. This precedent must be construed narrowly by future courts
because every case and factual situation will be different.
VI. CONCLUSION
The central objective of the ADA is to allow disabled persons to
participate and compete on an equal basis. The Supreme Court in
Martin has reiterated the "policy statement to the world," no longer
tolerating lost potential and requiring judgment of people by their
abilities, not their disabilities. 429 The Supreme Court has granted the
"privilege" of equal access not only to Casey Martin, but to other
429. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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qualified professional golfers, such as Ford Olinger and JaRo Jones,
and to other qualified professional athletes who seek equal access to
pursue their dreams of competing at an elite level in a sport in which
they have mastered the skills essential to the game. This is precisely
what the ADA seeks to ensure for all disabled individuals, and what
entities such as the USGA and PGA should be required to provide.
Julie L. Livergood
R.N., M.S.N.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:125
